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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan*
Stephen M. LaMastra
and
William J. Sheppard***
This Article surveys case law and legislative developments in the
Georgia law of real property for the period June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1994.
An overwhelming majority of cases decided by the Georgia appellate
courts during the survey period reaffirmed established principles of real
property law, albeit sometimes in unusual factual settings. The Georgia
legislature was, however, actively creating new statutes and refining old
ones. This article is intended to provide the practitioner with a
convenient guide to both judicial and legislative activities during the
survey period.
I. LAND LINES AND BOUNDARIES
In Hatcher v. Hatcher,' Ernest Hatcher ("Hatcher") owned property
in Laurens County and, in 1988, agreed to lease a portion of it to his
nephew, J.R. Hatcher, for life.' Hatcher asked his attorney, Dale
Thompson, to draw up a document leasing the tract to J.R. for life and
giving J.R. fishing rights in a pond on Hatcher's land. Hatcher refused
to have a survey of the property made and, consequently, Thompson
described the leased tract from a simple drawing of the property. J.R.
placed a camper in the approximate center of the leased tract.3
* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning, Martin, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (A.B., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Corporate Counsel & Director of Real Estate, Wolf Camera, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia.
Former Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University
(B.A., 1987); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1986); Mercer University (J.D., 1992). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 211 Ga. App. 869, 440 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
2. Id. at 869, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
3. Id. at 869-70, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
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JR. lived on the tract without incident for more than two years before
a dispute arose. At that point, Hatcher dug a drainage ditch across the
driveway on the leased tract, thereby preventing J.R. from driving onto
the property. Hatcher brought an action alleging that the mobile home
was not located on the leased tract.4
Hatcher based his argument on what he contended was an ambiguity
in the description of the leased tract and argued that the lease was
unenforceable for lack of an adequate description of the leased premises.5 The lease described the property as: "A tract of land fronting 60
yards on Hilbridge Road and extending back in equal width a depth of
130 yards in land lot 50 in the 18th land district of Laurens County."
The trial court rejected Hatcher's argument that the lease did not
sufficiently describe his intention regarding the quantity and location of
the lease tract and found for J.R.7
The appellate court affirmed the trial court." The court quoted from
Weisner v. Gulledge,9 stating that:
"Perfection in legal descriptions of tracts of land is not required. 'If
the premises are so referred to as to indicate ... [the grantor's]
intention to convey a particular tract of land, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to show the precise location and boundaries of such tract.
The test as to the sufficiency of the description of property contained
in the deed is whether or not it discloses with sufficient certainty what
the intention of the grantor was with respect to the quantity and
location of land therein referred to, so that its identification is
practicable. [Tihe key to the intention of the grantor must be found in
the document itself.'" 0
At trial, both J.R. and Hatcher presented testimony from expert
witnesses (surveyors) "that when property is described as extending back
'in equal width' it is customarily interpreted as meaning at 90 degree

4. Id. at 870, 440 S.E.2d at 756.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 869-70, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
7. Id. at 870, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
8. ld. at 871, 440 S.E.2d at 757. Originally, Hatcher filed his appeal with the Georgia
Supreme Court, but the appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. Id at 869, 440
S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991)). The
court of appeals began its opinion by stating that jurisdiction was proper in that court
because the equitable relief sought by Ernest was incidental to and secondary to the
principal issue of the location of property lines, which is a legal issue. Id., 440 S.E.2d at
755-56.
9. 251 Ga. 419, 420, 306 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1983).
10. Hatcher, 211 Ga. App. at 870, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
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angles."11 Based on that testimony, the court concluded that the mobile
home was within the leased tract.'

II. TrrLE TO LAND
In FirstRebecca Baptist Church, Inc. v. Atlantic Cotton Mills,' the
subject was the effect of a reverter clause in a deed to a charitable
Atlantic Cotton Mills conveyed the property at issue to
group.'
Rebecca Baptist Church pursuant to a deed which contained the
following reverter clause:
The said Second Parties [Rebecca Baptist Church] to have and to hold
the said lot of land and its appurtenances forever, in trust for the sole
use, benefit and enjoyment of Rebecca and the members thereof, the
same to be used as a place for divine worship by the congregation of
said church, in fee simple, but only so long as said lot is used for such
church purposes, it being expressly provided that if said lot of land
should ever cease to be used for such church purposes, then the title
thereto, that is all the right, title and interest hereby conveyed, shall
immediately revert to the First Part, its successors and assigns.1 5
In 1979, the majority of the congregation known as Rebecca Baptist
Church voted to move to Rivoli Crossing and chose as its name Rivoli
Crossing Baptist Church. The minority of the congregation took the
name First Rebecca Baptist Church ("FRB") and, with the permission of
the majority, continued to worship at the property. 6
Atlantic brought this action against Rivoli and FRB, seeking a
declaration that the title to the property had reverted to it pursuant to
the reverter clause contained in the deed to Rebecca Baptist Church.
Rivoli and FRB answered and made competing claims to the property."
The trial court held that Rivoli was the original church named in the
deed from Atlantic and that the reverter clause was not activated by
Rivoli's move to its new location."8 FRB appealed.' 9
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and
found that Atlantic was the title owner of the property.20 First, the

11.
12.
13.

Id. at 870-71, 440 S.E.2d at 756.
Id. at 871, 440 S.E.2d at 757.
263 Ga. 688, 440 S.E.2d 159 (1993).

14. Id. at 688, 440 S.E.2d at 159-60.
15. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 160.
16.

Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court affirmed the finding that Rivoli was the same church that had
received the origirial conveyance from Atlantic. 1 According to Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 1 4 -5- 4 3 ,2 the majority
of the members of a church are presumed to constitute that church as an
entity.
Because Rivoli represented the majority of the original
church, that body retained all the original church's rights in the property
upon the split with FRB."'
Unfortunately for FRB and Rivoli, the court reversed the part of the
trial court's opinion which denied Atlantic's claim under the reverter
clause.' The court concluded that the language of the reverter clause
was clear and demanded a finding in favor of Atlantic.'
"[Tlhe
property [was] to be used for the 'sole use, benefit and enjoyment of
[Rivolil and the members thereof, the same to be used as a place, df
divine 'worship by the congregation of said church,' and that title
revert[ed] when the property [was] not used for 'such church purposes.' 27 When the majority of the original church ceased using the
Property as a place of worship, title reverted back to Atlantic."
The supreme court next considered whether the reverter clause was
unenforceable as a matter of law, an issue not decided by the trial
court."
The court affirmed the established rule in Georgia that
reverter clauses in deeds to charitable organizations do not constitute an

21. Id. at 688-89, 440 S.E.2d at 160. 22. O.C.G.A. § 14-5-43 (1994).
23. 263 Ga. at 688, 440 S.E.2d at 160. O.CG.A. section 14-5-43 states:
The majority of those who adhere to its organization and doctrines represent a
church. The withdrawal by one part of a congregation from the original body or
the uniting of a part of a congregation with another church or denomination is a
relinquishment of all rights in the church abandoned.
O.C.GA. § 14-5-43.
24. See First Rebecca, 263 Ga. at 689, 440 S.E.2d at 160.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id The trial court had no reason to decide this issue once it determined that the
reverter clause was not triggered by the majority congregation's move to Rivoli Crossing.
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impermissible restraint on the alienation of land.so Accordingly, the
provision at issue was enforceable pursuant to its terms. 31
In Merreti v. Beckwith, 2 the supreme court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court setting aside the transfer of certain real property from
Lillie Mae Merrell to her grandson as a fraudulent conveyance. 3
Merrell had executed a promissory note, due on demand, in favor of Bell
Dalton Beckwith in 1981. Beckwith testified at trial that she orally
demanded repayment of the note and had her attorney send a demand
for repayment on August 5, 1983. 34 In response to Beckwith's requests
for admission, Merrell admitted receiving the letter dated August 5, but
did not recall when she received it. 35 On August 10, 1983, Merrell
conveyed her home to her grandson ("McCart"), reserving a life estate in
herself.'
Beckwith filed an action based on Merrell's failure to pay the Note
upon demand and obtained a judgment on the note. 7 Beckwith then
filed an action seeking to set aside the transfer from Merrell to McCart
as a fraudulent conveyance. Merrell made a motion for directed verdict
at trial claiming that Beckwith had failed to produce evidence of
Merrell's actual intent to defraud Beckwith and failed to produce
evidence that McCart had knowledge of, or grounds to suspect, an intent
to defraud.' That motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Beckwith, and set aside the deed from Merrell. 9
On appeal, Merrell argued that the trial court erred in denying of her
motion for directed verdict and that the evidence did not support the
jury's verdict.4° The appellate court rejected both arguments and
affirmed.41 The court found that sufficient evidence existed both to

30. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 160-61 (citing Rustin v. Butler, 195 Ga. 389, 391, 24 S.E.2d 318,
320 (1943)). As explained by the court, the reason for this rule is the belief that the donor
of a gift for charitable purposes has the right to ensure that it continues to be used for
those purposes and to ensure that it is not alienated by the donee. Id. at 689-90, 440
S.E.2d at 161 (quoting J.C. Vance, Annotation, Validity andEffect of Provisionor Condition
Against Alienation, in Gift for CharitableTrust or to CharitableCorporation,100 A.L.R.2d
1208, 1209 (1965)).
31. Id. at 690, 440 S.E.2d at 161.
32. 263 Ga. 779, 439 S.E.2d 488 (1994).
33. Id. at 782, 439 S.E.2d at 490.
34. Id. at 779, 439 S.E.2d at 488.
35. Id. at 779 n.1, 439 S.E.2d at 488 n.1.
36. Id. at 779-80, 439 S.E.2d at 488.
37. Id. at 780 n.3, 439 S.E.2d at 488 n.3.
38. Id. at 780, 439 S.E.2d at 489.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 780-81, 439 S.E.2d at 489.
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require submitting the issue of Merrelrs fraudulent intent to the jury
and to support the jury's verdict.4' In reaching that conclusion the
court referred to evidence of four points: 1) that Merrell transferred the
property to McCart, a close family member, soon after an oral and
written request for payment of the Note; 2) that Merrell had no other
assets at the time of the transfer; 3) that the transfer was for very little,
if any, monetary consideration; and 4) that Merrell remained in
possession of the property for over seven years after the transfer.'
The court also rejected Merrell's contention that the trial court erred
in its jury instructions, by giving an erroneous instruction and by
refusing to give an instruction requested by Merrell." At Beckwith's
request, the court instructed the jury as follows: "[tiransactions between
relatives are to be scanned with care and scrutinized closely. And slight
evidence of fraud between them may be sufficient to set aside the
transaction."' The court found that charge was an accurate statement
The court
of the law and that it was supported by the evidence.'
found, however, that the charge submitted by Merrell on the legal
presumption arising from her continued possession of the property was
"incomplete and misleading" when it stated that "continued possession
of property by the grantor may create a 'badge of fraud' only if not
satisfactorily explained.' 7
For practitioners involved in cases of alleged fraudulent conveyances,
this case provides several items of useful information. First, specific
elements of proof are enumerated which, if proven, create a question of
fact as to whether the intent to defraud existed. Second, the court has
identified an acceptable jury instruction to be used in such cases.
The court in Martin v. Schindley8 held that a co-owner of certain
real property was entitled to equitable partition because her co-owner
had not properly exercised his option to purchase her interest.49 Susan
Martin and Alan Schindley were divorced co-owners of the property.
The settlement agreement incorporated into their divorce decree divided
their equity in the property and gave Schindley an option to purchase
Martin's interest in the property for $8,066.10. The option was

42. Id. at 781, 439 S.E.2d at 489.
43. Id.
44. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 490.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 781-82, 439 S.E.2d at 490.
Id. at 782, 439 S.E.2d at 490.
Id.
264 Ga. 142, 442 S.E.2d 239 (1994).
Id. at 144, 442 S.E.2d at 241.
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exercisable by Schindley by notice to Martin within sixty days after May
5, 1991. 50
On July 2, 1991, Schindley filed a bankruptcy petition in which he
scheduled a one-half interest in the property and listed Martin as an
unsecured creditor in the amount of $8,066.10. Martin was notified of
the filing by the bankruptcy court. Schindley subsequently obtained a
discharge in bankruptcy. Thereafter, Martin filed this action and sought
equitable partition of the property. Schindley answered, claiming that
his discharge in bankruptcy barred Martin's complaint. In essence,
Schindley argued that, by listing Martin as an unsecured creditor for the
amount of his purchase option and giving Martin notice of the listing, he
had exercised his option to purchase her share in the property.51 The
trial court granted Schindley's motion to dismiss and the court of
appeals affirmed. 2
The supreme court reversed." The court stated that an option
contract does not grant the party having the option any legal or
equitable interest in the property until the option has been exercised
according to its terms. 54 The court found that Schindley had not
exercised his option on or before the date he filed his petition in
bankruptcy and, therefore, had no interest in Martin's property interest
on that date. 5' The court also found that the bankruptcy court's
mailing of the bankruptcy petition to Martin as a listed creditor on July
5, 1991, was not a proper exercise of the option as the notice did not
5'
come from Schindley to Martin, and was in any event untimely.
Because Schindley had no interest in Martin's property that could be
affected by his discharge in bankruptcy, Martin's claim for partition was
not barred. 7
In Raulerson v. Smithwick,5" the supreme court clarified the meaning
of the phrase "joint lives" when used in the grant of a life estate to two
persons.5 9 Walter Smithwick, III purchased large parcel of land from
Dwight Raulerson and E.D. Raulerson. As part of the transaction,
Smithwick conveyed a small portion of that property to E.D. Raulerson

50.

Id. at 142-43, 442 S.E.2d at 240.

51. Schindley argued that he had become the owner of the property, while discharging
his obligation to pay. See id. at 143, 442 S.E.2d at 240.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id., 442 S.E.2d at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 143-44, 442 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 144, 442 S.E.2d at 241.
263 Ga. 805, 440 S.E.2d 164 (1994).
Id. at 806, 440 S.E.2d at 165.
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and his wife, Pauline Raulerson, by quitclaim deed. The house in which
the Raulersons had lived for many years was located on that portion of
the. larger tract. The deed granting the property recited that it
quitclaimed to the Raulersons all of Smithwick's right and title in "'A
LIFE ESTATE ONLY for the joint lives of [E.D. Raulerson and Pauline
Raulerson] .... "
Mr. Raulerson died and was survived by his wife, Pauline. Smithwick
then filed this action seeking possession of the small parcel and claiming
that the life estate terminated upon Mr. Raulerson's death. Both parties
summary judgment, and the trial court granted
filed motions for partial
61
Smithwick's motion.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling, finding that the
life estate did not terminate until the death of both Raulersons.6 2
Smithwick made his argument based solely on the definition of "joint
lives" contained in Black's Law Dictionary, and the appellate court
soundly rejected that definition as controlling in Georgia.' The court,
relying on O.C.G.A. section 44-6-81," held "that a life estate granted
to two or more persons for their joint lives' does not terminate as to the
survivor until such survivor's death, provided the deed or other
instrument does not contain specific limiting language directing an
earlier termination of the estate granted.""
In Hughes v. Cobb County,66 the supreme court affirmed a trial
court's grant of an application to remove and relocate a cemetery. 7
C.V. Nalley HI purchased a twelve-acre tract in Cobb County that
contained a small cemetery with approximately fifty-two grave sites.
Nalley applied for a permit to remove and relocate the grave sites and
gave notice to the descendants of the persons buried in the cemetery of
his application. The application first came before the Cobb County9
Cemetery Preservation Commission,' which denied the application.6
60. Id. at 805, 440 S.E.2d at 165.
61. Id. at 805-06, 440 S.E.2d at 165.
62. Id. at 806, 440 S.E.2d at 165 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 973 (4th ed. 1968)).

63. Id.
64.

O.C.GA. § 44-6-81 (1991).

65. 263 Ga. at 806, 440 S.E.2d at 165. The supreme court revisited this same issue in
the case of Hill v. Wimpy, 264 Ga. 198, 444 S.E.2d 803 (1994). In that case, the court
stated that the holding from Raulerson v. Smithwick controlled and that the trial court's
decision finding an earlier termination of the life estate was in error. 264 Ga. at 198, 444
S.E.2d at 803-04.
66. 264 Ga. 128, 441 S.E.2d 406 (1994).
67. Id. at 131, 441 S.E.2d at 409.
68. Id. at 128-29, 441 S.E.2d at 407. The Cemetery Preservation Comisssion is
empowered to hear and review applications for cemetery relocation and to make
recommendations to the Board of Commissioners. Id at 129 n.1, 441 S.E.2d at 407 n.1.
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The Cobb County Board of Commissioners then reviewed a modified
application and granted approval.7"
The descendants of the persons buried in the cemetery appealed the
decision of the Board of Commissioners to the Superior Court of Cobb
County."' In order to support his application, Nalley was required to
show the following: (1) that he was the title owner of the property
containing the cemetery; (2) that the location and boundaries of the
burial ground were delineated by a survey based on an archeologist's
report; (3) that he had developed a plan for notifying and had notified
descendents of those interred in the burial ground; and (4) that he had
a plan for disinterment and disposition of the remains. 2 The superior
court conducted a de novo review and found that the cemetery was a
family/neighborhood cemetery, that Naley had established his title
ownership of the property through an opinion letter of an attorney, and
that his application was otherwise complete.7" The court also found
that "it was appropriate to move the cemetery and that relocation would
preserve rather than destroy the cemetery's cultural and historical
significance to Cobb County."74
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that Naley
A family/neighborhood
owned a family/neighborhood cemetery.75
cemetery is one that has not been dedicated to public use, but has
instead been used by the landowner to the burial of "relatives or some
other portion of the public (e.g., neighbors and friends) but not the
community at large." 6 This is quite different from a "public" cemetery,
which is open to burial of members of the public.77 At trial, Nalley
presented a single witness who testified that no prior owner of the
property had dedicated the cemetary to public use. The descendants, on

69. Id. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 407.
70. Id. Nalley claims he amended his application to provide a different site for
relocation of the cemetery to accommodate concerns expressed by the Cemetery
Preservation Comisssion. Id.

71.

Id.

72.

See O.C.G.A. §§ 36-72-5, -6 (1993).

73.
74.
75.
76.

264 Ga. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 407.
Id.
Id. at 129-30, 441 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 407-08.

77. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 407. In order for Nalley to prove his title to the property, it was
essential that the court accept his argument that the cemetery was a family/neighborhood
cemetery. Otherwise, the cemetery would be deemed to have been "dedicated" for public
use, and Nalley's use of the property limited so as not to interfere with the public's interest
in continued use of the property. Id. at 130, 441 S.E.2d at 408 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230
(1991)).
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the other hand, presented several witnesses.7' Apparently, the trial
court believed Nalley's witness was more convincing. The appellate
court specifically found that there was evidence in the record at trial to
support the judgment in favor of Nalley and refused to substitute its
opinion for the opinion of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
the witnesses."
III. EASEMENTS AND RIGHTS OF WAY
In Avery v. ColOnialPipeline Co.,' the court of appeals held that the
holder of an easement for use as a pipeline had a right to remove trees
and vegetation from the right-of-way and to trim trees overhanging the
easement so that it may be inspected from the air.81 Colonial Pipeline
Company and Plantation Pipeline Company transport refined petroleum
products via underground pipelines. The products transported by
Colonial and Plantation ("defendants") are regulated by federal law.' 2
The plaintiffs ("Avery") are the successors-in-interest of the parties that
granted easements to defendants to construct and maintain pipelines to
be used in their business. sa
Defendants received notice from the federal regulatory agency charged
with overseeing their pipeline operations that they were in probable
violation of the requirements for maintaining the easements."
Specifically, the easements were "overgrown with large trees and bushes
which obscured [them] to the extent that aerial patrolling was ineffective
in determining the surface conditions on or adjacent to the pipeline
right-of-way."' When defendants notified Avery that they intended to
enter the easements and to cut trees and other vegetation, Avery filed
an action seeking declaratory relief and damages. The trial court
granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment ruling that

78. Id. at 130, 441 S.E.2d at 408.
79. Id. From the court's comments, it seems clear the descendants argued that the side
with the most witnesses should win. However, this case proves the opposite.
80. 213 Ga. App. 388, 444 S.E.2d 363 (1994).
81. Id. at 391, 444 S.E.2d at 365.
82. Id. at 392, 444 S.E.2d at 366.
83. Id. at 388, 444 S.E.2d at 363. Ignitable refined petroleum, which defendants
transport in their pipelines, is classified as a hazardous liquid and regulated by the United
States Department of Transpertation's Office of Pipeline Safety under the Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Safety Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Id. (citing 49
U.S.C. § 20001 et seq.; 49 C.F.R., Part 195).

84.

Id. at 389, 444 S.E.2d at 364.

85. Id. Federal regulations required that the Easements "be maintained so as to have
'clear visibility and to give reasonable access to maintenance crews.'" Id (citing 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.3(cX3)(ii) (1993)).
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defendants could enter onto the easements to "remove trees, vegetation,
and overhang.'
The trial court reserved ruling on damages.8 7
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with regard
to defendants' right to cut vegetation in the easements.88 The court
relied on the holding from Jakobsen v. Colonial Pipeline Co.9 to
conclude that defendants have an implied right to clear the easements
as required by the federal regulators.' In Jakobsen, the supreme court
found that pipeline easements "impliedly include the right to side-trim
trees so that [the pipeline operator] might aerially inspect the pipelines
to determine whether they are in need of maintenance, repair, or are
otherwise a public hazard." Therefore, defendants were entitled to go
on the easements and the trial court's ruling to that effect was proper.
The court of appeals pointed out, however, that the defendants' right
to cut vegetation in and around the easements was not without limitation, and also held that the trial court's ruling did not grant unlimited
Only that removal required "to give
discretion to defendants."
reasonable access to maintenance crews" was authorized." The court
noted that the trial court's ruling did not "authorize removal [of
vegetation] regardless of need" and specifically reserved decision on the
issue of any damages that may have been caused by excessive clearing." This case is yet another that severely restrains the grantee of an
easement from unfettered control of the easement property. For this
reason alone, Georgia real estate professionals should carefully review
Avery.
The court in Smith v. Tolbert" held that purchasers of real property
have a duty to determine the interest of those occupying or using the

86. Id. at 388, 444 S.E.2d at 363.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 389-90, 444 S.E.2d at 364.
89. 260 Ga. 565, 397 S.E.2d 435 (1990). Jakobsen v. Colonial Pipeline Co. has been the
subject of discussion in prior surveys of Georgia law. See T. Daniel Brannan, Stephen M.
LaMastra & T. Michael Tennant, Real Property,45 MERCER L. REV. 365-66 (1993); Robert
L. Foreman, Jr., T. Daniel Brannan & Stephen M. LaMastra, Real Property, 43 MERCER
L. REV. 354-55 (1991).
90. 213 Ga. App. at 390-91, 444 S.E.2d at 365.
91. Id. at 390,444 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Jakobsen,260 Ga. at 566 n.2, 397 S.E.2d at 436
n.2).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 391-92, 444 S.E.2d at 365-66.
94. Id. at 392, 444 S.E.2d at 366. Although not specifically mentioned in this regard,
presumably the court would also allow sufficient cutting to permit aerial observation of the
pipeline easement.
95. Id.
96. 211 Ga. App. 175, 438 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
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property at the time of the sale and cannot complain if their rights
under the deed from the sellers is subject to the rights of others
occupying or using the property' Mark Smith and Michael Miller
("purchasers") contracted with Ben and Louise Tolbert ("sellers") for the
purchase of a two story commercial building in the City of Roswell. A
gravel driveway and parking area (the "Alley") were located behind the
property. The description of the property on the warranty deed included
the Alley and specifically noted the existence of the gravel driveway."
When the City of Roswell claimed fee simple to the Alley, the
purchasers demanded that the sellers defend that action based on the
covenant of warranty contained in the warranty deed. Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the sellers'
motion and denied the purchasers' motion." The purchasers appealed.'
The appellate court affirmed the trial court with regard to both
motions."0 ' The purchasers admitted that they knew of the existence
of the Alley and that it was used by the public.' The appellate court
rejected the purchasers argument that the Alley was "vacant property,"
and found that the property in dispute was in fact an alley.0" The
court also rejected the purchasers' argument that the Alley was a private
way because the public openly and obviously used the Alley as a parking
lot while shopping at the businesses located in the immediate vicinity.' ° The court concluded that the purchasers' warranty claims failed
"because 'the existence of a public road on land, known to the purchaser
or which should have been known to the purchaser, is not such an
incumbrance [sic] as would constitute a breach of the covenant of
warranty.'' 0 5 Additionally, the court found that the purchasers had
waived any warranty claim by failing to raise the issue of the public use
of the Alley when they had knowledge of that use prior to closing."°
This decision sends a powerful message to purchasers of real property:
Investigate the property and the uses to which it is put before buying.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
(1984)).
106.

Id. at 176-77, 438 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 176, 438 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 175-76, 438 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
Id. at 177, 438 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 176, 438 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Henderson, 169 Ga. App. 486, 487, 316 S.E.2d 503, 504
Id. at 176-77, 438 S.E.2d at 656-57.
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In several cases decided during the survey period, Georgia courts
discuss the requirements for establishing an easement by prescription.
The first such case is Eileen B. White & Associate v. Gunnells."7 The
plaintiff in that case, Eileen B. White & Associate, owned land on which
an asphalt road lay.""8 That road was built, maintained, and kept
open by plaintiff, but the Gunnells had been using it for more than
seven years as an alternate means of access and egress to their property,
which adjoined plaintiff's. Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin Gunnells
from continuing to use the road. Gunnells counterclaimed, alleging a
prescriptive easement and seeking to enjoin plaintiff from interfering
The trial court found for the Gunnells
with their use of the road.'
and declared that a prescriptive easement existed in their favor.
Further, the court enjoined plaintiff from interfering with the Gunnells'
use of the road.1 Plaintiff appealed."'
The supreme court reversed, finding that Gunnells had failed to prove
the elements necessary to the creation of a prescriptive easement."'
The court first set out the elements an applicant must prove in order to
establish the existence of a prescriptive easement: (1) uninterrupted use
of the way for seven or more years; (2) that the way does not exceed 20
feet in width and that it is the same 20 feet originally appropriated; and
(3) that he has kept it open and in repair during the seven year
period." 3 The court found that the appellees had failed4 to allege and
show that they had "kept the road open and in repair.""
As the supreme court explained, the requirement that the road be
maintained by the party claiming an easement by prescription is related
to the requirement that the owner of property be given notice of an
Simply using the road
adverse claim made by another party."'
without express permission of the owner, even where the owner is aware
of that use, is insufficient to establish an easement by prescription." 6
The owner's acquiescence without some form of adverse use establishes,
at most, a revocable license." 7 By requiring that the claiming party

107.
108.

263 Ga. 360, 434 S.E.2d 477 (1993).
Id. at 360, 434 S.E.2d at 477.

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id., 434 S.E.2d at 477-78.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 360-63, 434 S.E.2d at 477-79.
Id. at 360, 434 S.E.2d at 478.
Id.
Id. at 360-61, 434 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 361-62, 434 S.E.2d at 478-79.
Id. at 362, 434 S.E.2d at 479.
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make ,repairs in order to keep the road open, the court reinforced the
notion that only an adverse use will suffice.""
The Gunnells cited several cases that hold that an owner's acquiescence in the use of his property for seven years without notice of an
adverse claim in the form of repairs or otherwise would grant- a
prescriptive easement to the user."1 The court rejected that argument
and expressly overruled those cases to the extent that they so held.10
Jackson v. Stone12 1 is another case which dealt with the creation of
a prescriptive easement.' Harold and Betty Stone, Weldon Cantrell,
and G.C* and Irene Lunsford (collectively referred to as the "Stones")
filed an action seeking a declaration of their rights regarding a road,
which adjacent property owners had been using to provide access to their
own land, running across the Stones' property. Paul Jackson, Floyd
Jackson, and W. C. Crider (collectively referred to as the "Jacksons")
purchased property adjoining the Stones' property in 1989 and considered the road running across the Stones' property as the most convenient
access to the Jacksons' property' ,
Thereafter, the Stones erected a gate across the road. The Jacksons,
in the process of developing their property, took down the gate and
scraped the road with a grader, which prompted the Stones to file this
action.' 4 The Jacksons, in defending their right to use the road, made
a two-part argument. First, they argued that the southern portion of the
road was public which the Stones could not reappropriate. Second, they
argued that they had acquired a prescriptive easement to the northern
section of the road through their predecessor in title.' 25 The trial court
rejected the Jacksons' arguments and concluded that the southern
portion of the road in issue was a private road and that the Jacksons
had not acquired an easement by prescription over the northern portion
of the road.'
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the evidence did
not support a finding that the southern portion of the road was a public
road."2 A dedication to public use is not complete until both the

118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Rizer v. Hams, 182 Ga. App. 31,33-34,354 S.E.2d 660,662 (1987); Fine
v. Strauss, 86 Ga. App. 354, 355 n.2, 71 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1952)).

120. Id.
121.
122.
123.

210 Ga. App. 465, 436 S.E.2d 673 (1993).
Id. at 466, 436 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 465-66, 436 S.E.2d at 675.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 466-68, 436 S.E.2d at 675-76.
Id. at 468, 436 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 467, 436 S.E.2d at 675.
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intention of the owner to dedicate it and the acceptance on the part of
the public is shown.' The court found that the evidence showed that
the Stones had granted easements to the use of the road in some
instances and had specifically refused to grant easements in others,
thereby retaining control over who used the road.' 9 The court also
noted testimony which indicated that the county's delivery of gravel to
and grading of the southern portion of the road did not indicate the
road's dedication to the public.18
With regard to the Jacksons' claim to a prescriptive easement over the
northern section of the road, the court found that Jackson failed to show
the essential element of continuous use for the prescriptive period.13
The Jacksons depended on the use of their predecessor in title to their
property to establish continuous use for seven years. However, the court
found evidence that the road as then in use was not identical to that
used by the Jacksons' predecessors in title.132 Therefore, the Jacksons
were unable to establish seven years' use over the same roadway.13 3
Additionally, the court found the evidence uncontroverted that neither
the Jacksons nor their predecessors in title gave notice of their adverse
use of the Stones' property either by building the road or contributing to
its repair and maintenance. 34 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial
court's finding that the northern portion of the road was not subject to
a prescriptive easement.3 5
IV COVENANTS
In Prime Bank v. Galler,' the court held that, where strict enforcement of restrictive covenants results in an undue hardship on the party
against whom such covenants are enforced, the court should consider
whether the harm to the enforcing party may be alleviated by less
drastic measures.3 7 The Gallers purchased a lot in the Amanda
Woods Subdivision. All the lots in that subdivision were subject to
restrictive covenants which, among other things, required the builder to

128. Id. at 466, 436 S.E.2d at 675.
129. Id. at 466-67, 436 S.E.2d at 675. These prior exercises by the Stones of control
over who used the road, while not alone dispositive, was a significant factor in the court's
decision. Id.
130. Id. at 467, 436 S.E.2d at 675.
131. Id. at 467-68, 436 S.E.2d at 676.
132. Id
133. Id. at 467, 436 S.E.2d at 676.
134. Id. at 468, 436 S.E.2d at 676.
135. Id.
136. 263 Ga. 286, 430 S°E.2d 735 (1993).
137. Id. at 289, 430 S.E.2d at 738.
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obtain approval of all construction plans by an architectural control
committee ("ACC") before beginning construction."8 Robert Carpenter
owned the lot adjacent to the Gallers' lot, and Prime Bank loaned
Carpenter the money to build a house on his lot. 3 ' The plans for
Carpenter's house were submitted to ACC, and were approved according
Carpenter began construction of a
to the terms of the covenants.'
house on his lot, but built that house according to a mirror image plan
from that submitted to ACC. Prime Bank foreclosed on the house after
41
Carpenter died.

The Gallers filed a lawsuit seeking to have the house on Carpenter's
lot demolished because it did not fit within the design scheme of the
neighborhood, and because it was based on plans not approved by ACC.
Specifically, the house was built so that the blank wall from it faced the
Gallers' windows. 42 The trial court found that the house as built
43
violated the restrictive covenants and ordered the house demolished.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court, finding that the
Carpenter house violated the restrictive covenants. 1" The court also
agreed that the restrictive covenants that applied to Carpenter's lot
bound Prime Bank, and that Prime Bank's construction of the Carpenter
145
house constituted a continuing violation of the restrictive covenants.
However, the supreme court disagreed wih the trial court's finding that
the Carpenter house should be demolished.'"
Although equitable relief granted by a trial court should not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion, the supreme court in Galler
stated that the conveniences of the parties cannot be ignored when
attempting to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. 47 The
court found evidence in the record that the Gallers' complaint could be
alleviated by a less drastic measure than demolition of the house.'"
Accordingly, the court remanded the case "for a careful consideration of
138. Id. at 287, 430 S.E.2d at 737.
139. Id.
140. Id. Approval of plans submitted to ACC could be obtained by default where the
plans were not rejected after 45 days from the date of submission. Carpenter's plans were
approved through this default method. Id But see infra notes 150-53 and accompanying
text discussing dissenting opinion.
141. 263 Ga. at 287, 430 S.E.2d at 737.
142. Id. at 287-88, 430 S.E.2d at 737.
143. Id. at 288, 430 S.E.2d at 737-38.
144. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 738. This action involved the granting of equitable relief to the
Gallers and was, therefore, properly appealed directly to the supreme court.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 288-89, 430 S.E.2d at 738-39.
147. Id. at 288, 430 S.E.2d at 738.
148. Id. at 289, 430 S.E.2d at 738.
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the conveniences of the parties" with the admonition that the injunction
"be crafted in a manner that is the least oppressive to [Prime Bank)
while still protecting the valuable rights of the [Gallersi. " 4
Justice Carley wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion in which he argued
that the majority's decision to remand with instruction was in error, and
5
that the trial court's decision should simply have been reversed. W
Justice Carley opined that the plans for Carpenter's house as built had
been approved by ACC and that the house was not in violation of the
restrictive covenants which applied to the lot. 5 ' He based his dissenting opinion on the dual roles played in this case by both Carpenter
himself and Mr. Killy Kunimoto, Carpenter's architect. Carpenter and
Kunimoto were the members of the ACC.5 2 Justice Carley believed
that both Carpenter and Kunimoto failed to approve or disapprove the
plans for Carpenter's house within forty-five days after those plans were
known to them in their capacities as members of the ACC. Their failure
to object to the plans within that time resulted in ACC's approval of the
plans by default.' Practitioners should review the dissenting opinion
in this case because it points out the problems that may arise from the
common situation where developers of subdivisions wear many hats,
including those of property owner and member of governing committees.
V.

LANDLORD/TENANT AND DISPOSSESSION

In Central Warehouse & Development Corp. v. Nostalgia, Inc.," the
court of appeals held that, absent a lease provision obligating a tenant
to purchase and maintain fire insurance, an exculpatory provision
purporting to relieve the landlord from damages arising from its sole
negligence is unenforceable.' 5 Beginning in 1985, Nostalgia, Inc.
executed a series of one-year written leases for warehouse space owned
by Central Warehouse & Development Corp.'
The last such lease
covered the one-year term beginning on September 1, 1989, and ending
on August 31, 1990.' The lease contained a provision entitled "FIRE"
which stated in pertinent part:

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
263 Ga. at 289-92, 430 S.E.2d at 73941 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 291, 430 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 290, 430 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 291-92, 430 S.E.2d at 740.
210 Ga. App. 15, 435 S.E.2d 230 (1993).
Id. at 17, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
Id at 15, 435 S.E.2d at 231.

157. Id.
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LANDLORD shall not be liable for any damages to fixtures or
merchandise of Tenant caused by fire or other insurable hazards
regardless of the cause thereof. Tenant shall not be liable for any
damages to leased premises or any part thereof, caused by fire or other
insurable hazards, regardless of the cause thereof. Landlord and
Tenant hereby expressly release each other from all liability for such
damage. Both Landlord and Tenant hereby agree that all insurance
policies issued to either or both of them shall include a clause waiving
right of subrogation against the other."
The lease also contained a provision that granted Nostalgia the option
to renew the lease for one year with rent of $650 per month, with all
other terms and conditions remaining the same. 59 The lease required
Nostalgia to give Central at least three months written notice of its
intention to vacate the property at the end of the lease term.160
When Nostalgia's lease ended, neither party attempted to terminate
On
their relationship, and Nostalgia remained in possession.'
November 22, 1990, the leased premises were destroyed by fire. The fire
started in the space adjoining Nostalgia's warehouse, but spread to
Nostalgia's space and destroyed its inventory. Nostalgia brought suit
against Central and the adjoining tenant alleging joint negligence, and
seeking to recover damages. Both Central and Nostalgia moved for
partial summary judgment on the effect of the "Fire" provision, with
Nostalgia contending that the provision was unenforceable and did not
preclude Nostalgia from recovering against Central in the event that the
fire was caused by Central's negligence. 6 ' The trial court assumed,
but did not decide, that both parties were bound by the terms of the
lease even though it had expired prior to the occurrence of the fire.''
The trial court then found that the "Fire" provision was unenforceable
Central apand granted partial summary judgment to Nostalgia.'
pealed.'"
The court of appeals relying on O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b),' 1 upheld
the trial court's ruling that the fire provision in the lease was unenforce-

158. Id.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id., 435 S.E.2d at 232.
Id., 435 S.E.2d at 231-32.
Id at 15-16, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
Id. at 16, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
Id.

166.

O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (Supp. 1994).
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able." 7 The court first noted that parties to a contract are generally
free to waive their right to recover damages resulting from the negligence of another contracting party if the intention to do so is clearly
expressed.'" Section 13-8-2 sets forth the categories of contracts
which are unenforceable under Georgia law and provides in part: 6 9
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection
with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure,
appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify or hold
harmless the promisee against liability for damages arising of bodily
injury to persons or damaged property caused by or resulting from the
sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnity
is against public policy and is void and unenforceable, provided that
this subsection shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract,
'compensation, or agreement issued by an admitted insurworker's
70
er.1

This statute applies to lease contracts, and the court in Nostalgiarelied
its holding that the lease provision was void
on the statute to support
17
and unenforceable.
In order to avoid the effect of O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b), Central
argued that the Fire provision in the Lease did not attempt to have the
parties held harmless from damages caused by their sole negligence. 72
Central argued that "the parties' intention was to shift the risk of any
loss to an insurance carrier." 7" In support of its argument, Central
cited 7zxedo Plumbing & Co. v. Lie-Nielsen,7 4 and McAbee ConStrucinterpreting contract
tion Co. v. Georgia Craft Co.,76 two Georgia cases
76
provisions similar to that at issue in this case.
The court of appeals rejected Central's argument and distinguished
Tuxedo Plumbingand McAbee Constructionfrom the case before it. The
court found that in both of those cases, unlike this one, the lease
contract required that the parties purchase insurance. 177 However, the

167.

210 Ga. App. at 16-17, 435 S.E.2d at 232-33.

168. Id. at 16, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
169. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (Supp. 1994).
170. d. § 13-8-2(b).
171. 210 Ga. App. at 16, 435 S.E.2d at 232.

172. Id.
173. Id.

174. 245 Ga. 27, 262 S.E.2d 794 (1980).
175.

178 Ga. App. 496, 343 S.E.2d 513 (1986).

176. 210 Ga. App. at 16, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
177. Id.
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lease between Nostalgia and Central did not contain such a requirement.17 The absence of such a requirement in the lease demanded a
finding that the parties did not intend to shift the risk of loss to an
insurance company."' The absence of such a "mandatory insurance
provision render[ed] the release provision void as against public policy,
and consequently unenforceable. " "s°
In the case of Rucker v. Wynn,"5 the court of appeals held that a
landlord under a commercial lease is not required to mitigate the
damages that result from a breach by the tenant." 2 In that case, the
landlord and tenants executed a commercial lease covering premises to
be used for the operation of a restaurant business for a term of five
years beginning on July 1, 1990."' The lease contained a provision
stating that the failure to pay rent on the first of each month was a
The lease also contained
default constituting a breach of the lease.'
a provision stating that in the event of a default, the landlord, without
notice,
"as Tenant's agent, without terminating this lease may enter upon and
rent the premises, in whole or in part, at the best price obtainable by
reasonable effort, without advertisement and by private negotiations
and for any term Landlord deems proper, with Tenant being liable to
Landlord for the deficiency, if any, between Tenants' rent hereunder
and the price obtained by Landlord on reletting; provided, however,
that Landlord shall not be considered to be under any duty by reason
of this provision to take any action to mitigate damages by reason of
Tenants' default."1s
On or about January 7, 1991, the tenants gave the landlord a check
for the amount of the rent due on January 1, but told the landlord their
account contained insufficient funds to pay the check."8 6 The landlord
apparently agreed to hold the check for some time to allow the tenants
to operate the business and generate funds to cover the amount of the
rent, but there was a conflict in the evidence regarding how long the
landlord agreed to wait. I8" When the landlord deposited the check on
178. Id.
179. Id. at 16-17, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
180. Id. at 17, 435 S.E.2d at 232.
181. 121 Ga. App. 69, 441 S.E.2d 417 (1994).
182. Id. at 70-71, 441 S.E.2d at 419. The court also stated other aspects of the law
common to disputes between landlords and'tenants. Id. at 71-72, 441 S.E.2d at 419-20.
183. Id. at 69, 441 S.E.2d at 419.

184. Id. at 69-70, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
185. Id. at 70, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
186.
187.

Id. at 69, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
I& at 69-70, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
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January 16, 1991, it was returned for insufficient funds. as Pursuant
to the lease, the landlord entered the premises, retook possession, and
rerented it. The tenants brought suit against the landlord for wrongful
eviction, trespass, breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach
of the Lease, breach of an alleged oral contract to accept payment of
rent, and conversion of personal property. The landlord counterclaimed
for the amount of the past due rent under the lease, less the rent
generated by the rerental.'
The trial court granted summary judgment against the tenants on
each of their claims, with the exception of the conversion claim, and
granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord on its counterclaim,
plus additional sums for attorney fees and prejudgment interest.1
The tenants appealed that ruling. 91
Because the lease concerned a commercial building, which was not for
use as a dwelling place, the court stated that the landlord was entitled
to rely upon the terms of the lease which avoid the statutory notice and
other requirements for dispossessory proceedings." The court further
found that the landlord was entitled to rely on the default provisions
contained in the lease and that the landlord acted pursuant to the lease
in retaking possession without notice upon default by the tenants." 3
Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment with regard to the
claims of wrongful eviction, trespass, breach of implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment, and breach of the Lease.1 '
The court next addressed the grant of summary judgment with regard
to the tenants' claim that the landlord breached an oral agreement to
accept late rent payments. 95 The court affirmed the trial court's
ruling, finding that no consideration existed to support an oral contract
and that such a contract was voided by the provision in the lease stating
that the lease contained the entire agreement of the parties."'
The court of appeals next affirmed a commercial landlord's right to
re-enter and take possession of leased premises where the landlord can

188.
189.

Id. at 70, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
Id. at 69, 441 S.E.2d at 418-19.

190. Id.
191. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 419.
192. Id. at 70, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 70-71, 441 S.E.2d at 419.
195. Id. at 71, 441 S.E.2d at 419-20.
196. Id. The tenants apparently failed to present any testimony at trial regarding a
waiver by the landlord concerning timely rent payments, only raising a waiver argument
during the course of their appeal. Because the objection was not preserved in the trial
court, the appellate court refused to consider that issue. Id. at 71, 441 S.E.2d at 420.
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effect self-help eviction without a breach of the peace. 1' Because no
evidence existed of a breach of the peace in this case, the court found
that the re-entry was proper.19 The appellate court also found the
landlord was entitled to rely on the lease provision stating that the
Lease was not terminated and the right to claim rent was not extinRelying on Peterson v. PC. Towers, L.P,'
guished by eviction.I'
the court found that the language of the lease clearly expressed the
parties' intention that "after re-entry by the landlord to take possession
of the premises for re-rental, the tenants remained liable for accruing
rent and w[erel responsible to the landlord for the difference between the
tenants' rent accruing under the lease and the rent obtained by
reletting."2 1 Based upon the undisputed evidence in the record of the
deficiency left upon re-rental, the court upheld the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the landlord's counterclaim.' 2
In Bridges v. City of Moultrie,' the court of appeals decided an
appeal of a dispossessory action in which the dispossessed party argued
that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a landlord/tenant
relationship.'
In May 1977, Truett entered into a purchase and lease
transaction with CSX Transportation, formerly Seaboard Coast Railroad
Company ("CSX").' 5 Truett purchased a station depot building in
Moultrie, Georgia from CSX for use as a warehouse. The bill of sale
provided that the building was to be considered severed from the
Contemporaneously, Truett leased the realty from CSX. At
realty.'
the termination of the lease, Truett was required to remove the building
and all other personalty from the real property. The lease was
terminable by either party upon thirty days written notice.'sr
On November 8, 1991, the City of Moultrie acquired the realty from
CSX by quitclaim deed and also took an assignment of the lease to
Truett. Thereafter, the city notified Truett of its termination of the

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 72, 441 S.E.2d at 420.
200. 206 Ga. App. 591, 426 S.E.2d 243 (1992).
201. 212 Ga. App. at 72, 441 S.E.2d at 420.
202. Id. The court expressly reserved ruling on the issue of the landlord's duty to
mitigate damages. Id. at 72 n.1, 441 S.E.2d at 420 n.1. Like the tenants' claim of waiver
addressed previously, the tenant did not raise that issue at the trial court, and therefore,
not preserved for decision on appeal. Id.
203. 210 Ga. App. 697, 437 S.E.2d 368 (1993).
204. Id at 698-99, 437 S.E.2d at 370.
205. Id. at 697-98, 437 S.E.2d at 369.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 698, 437 S.E.2d at 369.
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lease, effective thirty days after notice.' Bridges refused to surrender
possession of the premises to the city.' The city filed a dispossessory
action and the court granted partial summary judgment and a writ of
both Truett and Bridges. 1" Bridges appealed from
possession against
211
that judgment.
On appeal, Bridges asserted that a factual issue existed regarding the
existence of a landlord/tenant relationship between him and the
City.2 12
Bridges argued that the purchase/lease agreement between
Truett and CSX gave Truett a first right of refusal to purchase the
property if CSX ceased operating a railroad on the adjoining railroad
tracts. 213 Alternatively, he argued that CSX had abandoned the
property and had no property interest to convey to the city.214 This
abandonment argument was based on a decision by the Interstate
CSX's request to abandon the railroad
Commerce Commission approving
215
line adjacent to the property.
The court rejected both arguments on the basis that a tenant may not
raise defects in the landlord's title to the property as a defense on a
proceeding for a writ of possession.216 It is well established in Georgia
that
"the law precludes [a tenant] from disputing his landlord's title 'while
he is in actual physical occupation, while he is performing any active
or passive act or taking any position whereby he expressly or impliedly
recognizes his landlord's title, or while he is taking any position that
is inconsistent with the position that the landlord's title is defective.'"217

The court found that Bridges' occupation of the property at issue in
this case necessarily arose from the purchase/lease agreement between
Truett and CSX.21 Therefore, his challenge to the city's title on any
grounds must fail.219 Finding no evidence to defeat the city's claim for

208. Id.
209. Id. Although the exact status of Bridges as the occupier of the property at issue
is unclear from the court's opinion, it appears that Bridges held possession as an assignee
or successor-in-interest to Truett. Id.
210. Id. at 697, 437 S.E.2d at 369.
211. Id. at 698 n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 369 n.1.
212. Id. at 698, 437 S.E.2d at 369.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 699, 437 S.E.2d at 370.
216. Id. at 698-99, 437 S.E.2d at 370.
217. Id. at 699, 437 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting O.C.GA § 44-7-9 (1991)).

218. Id.
219. Id.
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possession, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.220
Although the rule relied on in Bridges has recently been under attack,
the courts continually show their willingness to enforce it as in the past.
The court in Marsh v. Resolution Trust Corp.,2 21 dismissed an
innovative argument challenging the trial court's jurisdiction to decide
a dispossessory action.222 In April 1989, Marsh contracted to purchase
a home from Signature Homes, Inc. Signature allowed Marsh to take
possession of the premises prior to closing, but the sale between Marsh
and Signature never closed.'
In November 1990, while Marsh was
still in possession of the house, the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")
acquired the property through a foreclosure action and recorded a deed
reflecting its ownership. RTC demanded that Marsh vacate the
property. When Marsh refused, RTC filed a dispossessory action
alleging that Marsh was a tenant at sufferance.'
After hearing
evidence, the trial court entered judgment in favor of RTC in its
dispossessory claim and dismissed Marsh's counterclaim for the value of
improvements and repairs made to the property, as well as other
damages.'
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on RTC's
dispossessory claim.2 ' In doing so, the court rejected Marsh's argument that RTC had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and
tenant.22
The appellate court
relied on the same rule restated in
S
Browning discussed above.2
Marsh also argued, however, that the trial court was without authority
to enter a writ of possession in favor of RTC.229 Marsh pointed to the
fact that the trial court judge who issued the writ was a magistrate and
not properly appointed to hear the dispossessory action."
The
appellate court disagreed with both of Marsh's arguments and affirmed
the trial court's authority to enter the writ. 2 1

220. Id.
221.
222.

211 Ga. App. 216, 439 S.E.2d 75 (1993).
Id. at 217-18, 439 S.E.2d at 76-77.

223. Id. at 216, 439 S.E.2d at 76.
224. Id.
225. Id.

226. Id. at 218, 439 S.E.2d at 77.
227. Id. at 216-17, 439 S.E.2d at 76.
228. Id. at 217, 439 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting Hyman v. Leathers, 168 Ga. App. 112, 114,
308 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1983)).
229. Id.
230. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 76-77.
231. Id. at 217-18, 439 S.E.2d at 76-77.
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Where a judge needs assistance from another judge in the same
county, "'the chief judge of any court within such county... may make
a written request for assistance to the chief judge of any other court
within such county."' 2 The county records contained an order signed
by the chief magistrate of the county in which Marsh's case was pending
which designated the magistrate who entered the writ. The record also
showed that the designation was made pursuant to a request from the
Given that, the court found the
state court of that same county.'
designation was properly performed under O.C.G.A. section 15-1-9.1. 2
The court next rejected Marsh's argument that the failure to file the
designation "in the court minutes until the day after her trial" made the
writ improper.235 The statute controlling designation of judges by
request does not set a specific time within which the order of designation
must be filed.'
Absent such a requirement, the court found that the
presumption that a trial judge "'faithfully and lawfully performed the
duties devolving upon [her] by law'"2 7 controlled and upheld the
propriety of the designation in this case.'
VI.

SALES CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

The supreme court in Newborn v. Clay 9 reaffirmed the established
rule that a document purporting to transfer realty must adequately
James Newborn and
describe the property to be transferred.'
to
one
another,
purchased a
Carolyn Clay, during their marriage
four-acre tract of land as tenants in common. Subsequently, Newborn
and Clay separated and were divorced pursuant to a final decree which
Although the
incorporated their written settlement agreement. 2"
settlement agreement did not specifically address the disposition of the
property, it did contain a general provision which stated: "[Tihe parties
hereby acknowledge that all marital property was divided at the time of

232. Id. at 217, 439 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) (1994)).
233. Id.
234. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 77.
235. Id.
236. See O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) (1994).
237. 210 Ga. App. at 217,439 S.E.2d at 77 (quoting Morris v. Clark, 189 Ga. App. 228,
229, 375 S.E.2d 616, 617-18 (1988)).
238. Id. at 217-18, 439 S.E.2d at 77. The court found the designation substantially
complied with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1, and the absence of a timely
objection by Marsh made such substantial compliance sufficient. 210 Ga. App. at 218,439

S.E.2d at 77.
239. 263 Ga. 622, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993).
240. Id. at 623-24, 436 S.E.2d at 655.
241. Id. at 622, 436 S.E.2d at 654.
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separation; therefore, each party hereby waives any and all rights or
claims to any property in the possession of the opposite party.' 2
Undisputed was that Newborn was in sole possession of the real
property at issue when the final decree was entered and remained in
possession of that property through the time this action was commenced. 24
In June 1990, Clay conveyed her interest in the property by warranty
deed to Barry Price. Price thereafter claimed an interest in the property
and demanded rent from Newborn. In response, Newborn filed this
action against both Price and Clay alleging that he had acquired Clay's
interest in the property pursuant to the divorce decree.' 4 At the close
of discovery, Price and Clay filed motions for summary judgment. In
opposing those motions, Newborn contended that the divorce decree was
ambiguous and that the court should consider the intent of the parties
to determine the disposition of the property.2 5 The trial court granted
both defendants' motions for summary judgment, and Newborn
appealed.'
The supreme court rejected Newborn's contentions and concluded that
the divorce decree unambiguously failed to describe and dispose of the
property."'
Relying on White v. Lee2' and Cale v. Cale,2" the
court stated that "parties to a divorce decree must specifically describe
and dispose of [the real] property in which both parties have an interest
or the decree will not divest either party of their interest in the property."'
Because the divorce decree did not describe the property, the
decree did not affect the title and it remained in the name of the owners
as before the decree was entered. 1 Therefore, the court concluded
that Clay retained her undivided one-half interest in the property after
her divorce from Newborn and was free to convey that interest to
Price.
In a case involving the proposed development of a Publix-anchored
shopping center in Cobb County, the court of appeals held that promises
to contribute real property to a joint venture must be in writing in order

242. Id. at 622-23, 436 S.E.2d at 654.
243. Id. at 623 n.1, 436 S.E.2d at 654 n.1.

244. Id. at 623, 436 S.E.2d at 654.
245. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 654-55.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 250 Ga. 688, 300 S.E.2d 517 (1983).

249.
250.
251.
252.

242 Ga. 600, 250 S.E.2d 467 (1978).
263 Ga. at 623, 436 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 623-24, 436 S.E.2d at 655.
Id.
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to be enforceable against the conveying party.2" Asa G. Candler V,
Asa G. Candler VI, Richard B. Candler, and William R. Candler ("appellants") were in the business of locating and developing sites for shopping
centers with Publix Supermarkets as the major tenant. After a number
of meetings with Ray Sheppard, appellants entered into an oral joint
venture agreement with him which required Sheppard to contribute a
particular parcel of commercial realty to the joint venture and appellants
to contribute their expertise, service, and relationship with Publix in the
development of that realty. The parties signed a letter of intent that
same day. Subsequently, appellants discovered that the land was owned
by Clara Joy Sheppard ("appellee") rather than her husband.2
However, based on Sheppard's representations, appellants understood
the property was owned in appellee's name for tax purposes only, and
that Ray Sheppard had full authority "to manage, control and dispose of'
the property.'
After entering into the agreement with Sheppard, appellants hired an
architect to prepare a site plan and conducted engineering studies in
anticipation of developing the property. However, when a written joint
venture agreement was submitted to appellee, she refused to consummate the transaction. Appellants brought this action against Sheppard
and appellee for fraud and breach of an oral agreement to form a joint
venture. They sought damages and the imposition of an equitable lien
on the property.26 The trial court granted appellee's motion for
summary judgment and declared her real property free from any claim
of lien, and appellants appealed.257
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision relying
principally upon the Statute of Frauds.'
The court noted that
partnership or joint venture agreements generally are not required to be
written. 9 However, because this action involved the enforcement of
a contract to convey land, the court concluded that the Statute of Frauds
applied.'
The court held that any partnership agreement which

253.
(1993).
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

East Piedmont 120 Assocs., L.P. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 434 S.E.2d 101
Id. at 664, 434 S.E.2d at 101-02.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. at 664-65, 434 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. at 664, 434 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 665-66, 434 S.E.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 665, 434 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. at 665-66, 434 S.E.2d at 102-03.
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purports to permit a partner to act on behalf of others in contracts for
the sale of land must be written.26
Appellants argued that Sheppard's promise to transfer the property to
the joint venture was binding on appellee on the theory that Sheppard
was appellee's agent for purposes of negotiating the joint venture
agreement.2 2 However, it was undisputed that Sheppard had no
written authorization to act as agent for appellee in connection with the
transaction."' The court rejected appellants' argument that Sheppard's agreement to transfer the property was binding on appellee, and
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 2" The lesson practitioners
should draw from this decision is the basic one to put any real property
transaction, no matter how simple, in writing and in legal form.
Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the issue of
fraud in the real estate transactions. In both cases, the decisive issue
was the purchaser's reasonableness in relying on the alleged representations made by the sellers.265 In the first case, Delia Copeland purchased a house from Home Savings of America, F.A. in October
1989.2 6 Prior to her purchase, Copeland visited the property five to
ten times and had several other persons inspect the property on her
behalf.267
Copeland's inspections revealed several water-related
conditions, including the presence of a creek adjacent to the property.
She inquired of the real estate agent if there had been any flooding on
the property, but was informed that there had not. Copeland made no
further attempts to investigate whether the property was in a flood
hazard area.2'
During heavy rains approximately one and one-half years after
Copeland purchased the property, the property flooded. Copeland then
learned from the DeKalb County land records and her insurance agent
that the property was located in a flood hazard area. 9 When the
261. Id. (citing Shivers v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 490, 296 S.E.2d 749

(1982)).
262. Id. at 665, 434 S.E.2d at 102.
263. Id. at 666, 434 S.E.2d at 103.

264. Id. at 665-66, 434 S.E.2d at 102-03. The court also noted that the husband/wife
relationship between appellee and Sheppard did not obviate the need for written
authorization before Sheppard's promises to transfer property became binding on appellee.
Id. at 666, 434 S.E.2d at 103.
265. Copeland v. Home Sav. of Am., FA, 209 Ga. App. 173,433 S.E.2d 327 (1993); Ben
Farmer Realty Co. v. Woodward, 212 Ga. App. 74, 441 S.E.2d 421 (1994).
266. Copeland, 209 Ga. App. at 173, 433 S.E.2d at 328.
267. Id. Copeland's brother, roommate, plumber, and structural inspector viewed the
property at her request prior to her purchase. Id.
268. Id. at 173-74, 433 S.E.2d at 328-29.
269. Id. at 174, 433 S.E.2d at 328.

1994]

REAL PROPER7Y

429

seller refused Copeland's offer to rescind the sale, Copeland sued the
seller, the real estate broker and agent, and the surveying company and
surveyor based on fraudulent misrepresentation. The seller filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted."'
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that
Copeland failed, as a matter of law, to establish justifiable reliance on
any representation made by the defendants, and affirmed the trial
court's ruling." 1 The court concluded that the risk of flood hazard was
patent, given the presence of a creek adjacent to the property, and that
the defect Copeland complained of was equally open to all parties'
inspectionY 2 Copeland's failure to make any inquiry precluded her
from reasonably relying upon any representations by the defendants to
the contrary.273 Once again, Georgia courts impose a burden on
purchasers to thoroughly investigate any and all potential defects in real
property before purchasing.
In Ben FarmerRealty Co. v. Woodard,274 the court of appeals denied
recovery to a purchaser claiming fraud because the purchaser had not
taken reasonable precautions to protect herself from the alleged
fraud. 5 In this case, Ms. Woodard contracted to buy a vacant home
in an obviously dilapidated condition. The house was not livable in the
condition as sold, and Woodard purchased the house knowing she would
have to undertake substantial repairs.' 6 The sales contract prepared
by Woodard's agent contained a stipulation stating that the house was
being sold "as is and no termite certificate will be issued."2 77 Woodard
inspected the house prior to her purchase and observed an access
278 hole
in the ceiling leading to the attic, but failed to inspect the attic.
After purchasing the property, Woodard discovered fire damage to the
ceiling joists in the attic. Woodard testified that she could see the fire
damage from the floor of the house through the access hole in the ceiling
when her contractor pointed his flashlight straight up. The cost of
repairing the damage was estimated at $13,892.93.
Woodard sued the seller of the house and the real estate agents for the
seller, Ben Farmer Realty Co. and Rubin, claiming they fraudulently

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 173, 433 S.E.2d at 328.
Id. at 174-75, 433 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 175, 433 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 74, 441 S.E.2d 421 (1994).
Id. at 77, 441 S.E.2d at 424-25.
Id., 441 S.E.2d at 424.
Id. at 76, 441 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.
Id. at 76-77, 441 S.E.2d at 424.
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induced her to enter into the sales contract by concealing or failing to
reveal the fire damage in the attic of the home. Woodard sought to
All defenrecover the cost to repair the fire damage in the attic.'
dante moved for summary judgment. 28' The court granted summary
judgment for defendants on Woodard's tort claim for fraud based on
Woodard's failure to restore or offer to restore the property to the seller,
but denied summary judgment on Woodard's breach of contract
claims. 2 Both parties appealed.'
The court of appeals concluded, as an initial matter, that Woodard's
complaint and the trial record clearly showed that Woodard sought to
confirm the sales contract and sue for damages resulting from the
The court held that Woodard, "[hiaving
defendants' alleged fraud.'
elected to affirm the contract, the defrauded party [was] bound by its
terms and [was] subject to any defenses which may be asserted ...
based on the terms of the contract."N
The court noted that Woodard, in order to prevail on her claim of
passive concealment, must establish that the seller or its agent (1) was
aware of the defective condition in the property which could not be
discovered by the exercise of due diligence; (2) was aware that the
purchaser was ignorant of the defect; and (3) did not disclose that
defect.'
The court found no evidence in the record to support the
conclusion that Rubin or Ben Farmer Realty knew of the fire damFurther, the court found that Woodard failed as a matter of
age.
law to exercise due diligence in attempting to discover the defect which
The court noted that although Woodard
she claimed was concealed.'
was on notice to exercise a heightened degree of diligence in inspecting
this dilapidated property, she failed to inspect the attic and thereby
failed to identify damage which she admitted was easily visible. 9

280. Id. at 74,441 S.E.2d at 422. Woodard based her claim on the passive concealment
species of fraud. Id. at 75, 441 S.E.2d at 423. Wilhite v. Mays, changed the traditional
rule ofcaveat emptor and placed upon sellers of residential realty a duty to disclose defects
known to the seller of which the purchaser is unaware if those defects would affect the
decision of the purchaser to complete the transaction. Id. at 76, 441 S.E.2d at 423 (citing
Mulkey v. Waggoner, 177 Ga. App. 165, 166 S.E.2d 755 (1985)).
281. Id. at 74, 441 S.E.2d at 422.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 75, 441 S.E.2d at 423.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 76, 441 S.E.2d at 423 (citing U-Haul Co. v. Dillard Paper Co., 169 Ga. App.
280, 282, 312 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1983)).
287. Id. at 77, 441 S.E.2d at 424.
288. I&
289. Id.
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The court of appeals also found that Woodard was unable to rely on
an alleged representation that the "property was in reasonably sound
structural condition and in a good state of repair" because the contract
upon which she sued specifically disclaimed any representations
regarding the structural condition of the property
Based on its
findings, the appellate court reversed the partial denial of summary
judgment to Rubin and Ben Farmer on the breach of contract and
warranty claims and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on
Woodard's tort claims.2 1
In McCoy v. H. N. R. Investment Group, L.P,' the court of appeals
relied on Georgia's rule upholding parties' freedom to contract in
deciding that a real estate broker was entitled to a commission on the
sale of realty. 3 The McCoys entered in an exclusive listing agreement with Harry Norman Realtors, predecessor-in-interest to H. N. R.
Investment Group, L.P. ("HNR"), which gave HNR the exclusive right to
lease the McCoys' property for a minimum of ninety days and until
terminated by thirty days prior written notice. The agreement also
provided that if the McCoys sold the property to a tenant obtained by
HNR "during or after the lessee's term," the McCoys would pay HNR a
seven percent commission on the sales price.'
HNR obtained a tenant for the property. When the initial term of the
lease expired, the McCoys agreed with the tenant to extend the lease on
a month-to-month basis. Thereafter, without further assistance from
HNR, the McCoys negotiated a contract and sold the property to the
tenant. HNR then brought this action, seeking to collect a commission
on the sales price in accordance with its contract with the McCoys. The
McCoys and HNR filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 5 The
trial court granted the motion filed by HNR and denied the McCoy's
motion."S
On appeal, the McCoys argued first that HNR was not entitled to a
commission on the sale of the property because HNR had performed no

290. Id.
291. Id. at 78, 441 S.E.2d at 424. The court of appeals noted that the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment on Woodard's tort claim was based on her failure to
tender rescission upon discovery for the alleged fraud. Because Woodard sought to affirm
the contract, such a tender was unnecessary. The trial court's decision was right for the
wrong reason, and was therefore affirmed. Id. (citing Newsom v. Department of Human
Resources, 199 Ga. App. 419, 423, 405 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1991)).
292. 210 Ga. App. 645, 437 S.E.2d 355 (1993).
293. Id. at 646-47, 437 S.E.2d at 357.
294. Id. at 645, 437 S.E.2d at 356.
295. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 355.
296. Id.
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acts leading to the sale. Alternatively, the McCoys argued that a jury
question existed as to whether HNR's efforts were "reasonably related
in time to the actual sale." 9
The appellate court rejected both
arguments and found as a matter of law that HNR was entitled to
commission on the sale.'
Addressing the McCoys' arguments in reverse order, the court first
concluded that the commission agreement created an agency that was
terminable at will by either party upon thirty days written notice.'
The court found no evidence of written notice of termination in the
record and, therefore, concluded that the agency between HNR and the
McCoys was in existence at the time the sale was closed.'
Next, the
court found the agreement provided as a matter of law that HNR was
entitled to its commission despite the fact that it played no part in
arranging the sale of the property."1 The court noted that, as a
general rule, a real estate broker earns commissions "when, during the
agency, he finds a purchaser who is ready, able, and willing to buy, and
who actually offers to buy on the terms stipulated by the owner."'
In this case, the court concluded that the agreement changed the general
rule and obligated the McCoys to pay a commission to HNR if the
property was sold to a tenant procured by HNR during the term of the
agency relationship. 3 HNR earned a sales commission because a
tenant procured by HNR eventually bought the McCoys' property before
the termination of the agency relationship between HNR and the
McCoys..%4 Although the decision reached in this case appears
relatively straightforward, it is nonetheless significant in its protection
of the role of real estate brokers in Georgia. That protection follows a
trend established in recent years.
VII.

FORECLOSURES

In a procedurally interesting case from the Superior Court of Rockdale
County, the court of appeals held that a foreclosing creditor is required
to establish that the price received at the foreclosure sale is the true
market value of the property on the date of the foreclosure sale being

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id., 437 S.E.2d at 356.
Id. at 646-47, 437 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 646, 437 S.E.2d at 356.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 647, 437 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 646, 437 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 647, 437 S.E.2d at 357.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 358.
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confirmed, notwithstanding previous sales which have been set
aside.'
Sandra Frady owned four townhomes in Rockdale County,
which were subject to deeds to secure debt made in favor of Nationwide
Lending Group, Inc."° Chun and Michelle Kong acquired Ms. Frady's
interest in the townhomes. When the Kongs failed to make payments
as required under the terms of the secured promissory notes, Shearson
Lehman Hutton Mortgage Corp., as assignee of Nationwide's interest,
declared the notes in default. °7
After proper notice and advertisement, Shearson conducted a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale for each of the properties and, as the sole
bidder, purchased the properties for $41,500 each. Shearson then
reported the foreclosure sales to the superior court and petitioned the
court for confirmation.'
The Kongs opposed confirmation, arguing
that the foreclosure sales failed to produce the true market value of the
properties.3 At the conclusion of the hearing on Shearson's application for confirmation, the trial court orally set aside the original sales
and ordered resale of each property.31 Shearson, as the sole bidder for
and purchaser of each unit, then sought confirmation of the subsequent
resales." At the hearing on Shearson's second application, the court
confirmed that each property was purchased for its true market value
on the date of the resale. 12
The Kongs appealed, arguing that Shearson should have been required
to show the true market value of the property on the date of the initial
foreclosure sales. Otherwise, they argued, they would be unfairly held
accountable for any decline in the value of the properties between the
dates of the two sales. 13 The appellate court rejected that argument,
finding that O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161(b) 14 mandated that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale required the price received at a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale equal the true market value of the property "at the time
of the sale sought to be confirmed."1 ' In other words, the court found
that a foreclosing creditor is not required to show what the property may

305. Kong v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Mortgage Corp., 211 Ga. App. 93, 95, 438
S.E.2d 132, 133 (1993).
306. Id. at 94, 438 S.E.2d at 132.
307. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 132-33.
308. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 133.
309. Id.

310. Id.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id. at 94-95, 438 S.E.2d
Id. at 95, 438 S.E.2d at
O.C.GA. § 44-14-161(b)
211 Ga. App. at 95, 438

at 133.
133.
(1982).
S.E.2d at 133.
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have been worth at any other time besides the time of the foreclosure
sale. 16 The court noted that a seller of foreclosed property "is not the
insurer of its market value at the time of a judicially ordered resale."3 17 This somewhat harsh ruling contains a lesson for practitioners representing debtors in foreclosure. Debtors must be advised
carefully on opposing confirmation of a sale in a falling real estate
market because the debtor bears the risk of any decrease in market
value before a second sale.
The case of Willard v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co."15 presented a
novel method of enforcing a promissory note and may have a significant
impact on the practitioners of both general property law and the law of
partnerships. In that case, the supreme court implied that a partner
may be liable to a creditor on a promissory note even though the note
was signed only by his partner individually.319
The factual circumstances involved in Coburnare complex and require
careful explanation. Coburn executed a promissory note and security
deed (the "Coburn Note" and "Coburn Security Deed" respectively) in
favor of Great Western Mortgage Company ("GWM"), in connection with
Coburn's purchase of a house and lot. Coburn subsequently sold the
property to SYFTKOG, Inc. which "flipped" the property to Northern.
Northern financed his purchase through Fulton Federal Savings & Loan
and executed a note and security deed (the "Northern Note" and
"Northern Security Deed" respectively) in favor of Fulton Federal.
Stewart Title Guaranty Company issued a policy of title insurance
assuring, among other things, the priority of Fulton Federal's security
interest in the property."
The proceeds from the Fulton Federal loan should have been used to
retire the Coburn Note, but the check from the closing attorney was
dishonored and the note remained unpaid. Upon default under the
Coburn Note, GWM began foreclosure proceedings against the property.
Fulton Federal learned of the foreclosure, notified Stewart Title, and

316. Id
317. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 134. If, as the Kongs apparently believed, the properties sold
were worth more at the time of the first foreclosure sale than at the second, then the
court's decision imposing the decrease in value on the Kongs may appear inequitable.
However, as the court pointed out, the first sale was not confirmed at the Kongs' request.
Further, the Kongs did not appeal the trial court's decision ordering the properties resold
after the first foreclosure sales were set aside. The court obviously thought the Kongs had
taken a chance that the second sales would net a larger amount and refused to honor their
complaints when their gamble did not pay off. Id. at 96, 438 S.E.2d at 134.
318. 264 Ga. 555, 448 S.E.2d 696 (1994).
319. Id. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
320. 211 Ga. App. 357, 357, 439 S.E.2d 69, 70 (1993).
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demanded indemnity under the title insurance policy. Stewart Title
purchased GWM's interest in the Coburn Note and Security Deed and
quitclaimed its interest to Fulton Federal, thereby assuring Fulton
Federal a first priority security interest in the property. Stewart Title
filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court 2
When the Northern Note became in default, Fulton Federal foreclosed
on the property. Pursuant to an agreement it reached with Stewart
Title, Fulton Federal paid the proceeds of that sale into the registry of
the federal court. Also pursuant to that agreement, Stewart Title
attempted to collect on the unpaid Coburn Note. Stewart Title filed this
action in the State Court of Fulton County against Coburn and
Willard.
The evidence showed that Willard and Coburn had formed a corporation ("OBU") for conducting a home construction business. OBU obtained
a construction loan, guaranteed by Coburn and Willard, and built a
house on the property, but was unable to sell the property before the
loan came due. In order to pay off the construction loan, Coburn
executed the Coburn Note with GWM. Although Willard did not sign
the Coburn Note, he was substantially involved in arranging that financing.'
Willard "filled out the loan application, paid the loan application fee, obtained and paid for an appraisal of the property, reviewed the
closing documents and attended the closing.' 2
OBU reimbursed
Coburn for the down payment he made in connection with his purchase
of the property and paid the only two payments made on the Coburn
Note. Further, after Coburn sold the property, Willard shared in the
proceeds.'
Coburn, Willard, and Stewart Title each filed motions for summary
judgment.'3 The trial court granted Coburn's and Willard's motions
and denied Stewart Title's. 27 Stewart Title appealed the judgment of
the trial court with regard to each motion.'
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Coburn, and found that the trial court had erroneously
applied O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161 to preclude Stewart Title's claims
against Coburn.8' That Code section prevents a creditor from filing

321. Id.
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a lawsuit to recover any deficiency remaining on a debt after that
creditor has conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure.'
The trial court had
held that Fulton Federal and Stewart Title had entered into a "cooperative enterprise" to circumvent the requirement of confirmation by having
Fulton Federal foreclose on the property, but having Stewart Title sue
on the Coburn Note.' The appellate court stated that the trial court's
ruling had disregarded the fact that there were two notes and that
Fulton Federal had foreclosed on the Northern Security Deed." 2 The
court agreed with Stewart Title that the present action was not
prevented by Section 44-14-161 as Stewart Title's claim was based on
the Coburn Note, not the Northern Note.'
However, the court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment in favor of
Stewart Title.3"
The court also reversed the trial court's decision granting summary
judgment to Willard. 33' Stewart Title argued that Willard was liable
on the Coburn Note as a partner with Coburn in the development of the
property for sale. 33' The court found that there was "evidence that
Coburn was acting on behalf of a partnership including Willard, with
Willard's actual knowledge and consent, in obtaining the loan from
Great Western .

..

,.337

Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that

Willard did not sign the Coburn Note, the court found that there was a
question of fact whether he was liable as a partner for the debt
evidenced thereby.'

330. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
When any real estate is sold on foreclosure, without legal process, and under
powers contained in security deeds, mortgages, or other lien contracts and at the
sale the real estate does not bring the amount of the debt secured by the deed,

mortgage, or contract, no action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment
unless the person instituting the foreclosure proceedings shall, within 30 days
after the sale, report the sale to the judge of the superior court of the county in
which the land is located for confirmation and approval and shall obtain an order
of confirmation and approval thereon.

I& § 44-14-161(a).
331. 211 Ga. App. at 358, 439 S.E.2d at 70.
332. Id.
333. Id. The court could not consider the action brought by Stewart Title a deficiency
action because there had been no foreclosure of property owned by Coburn. Id. at 359, 439
S.E.2d at 71.
334. Id. at 359, 439 S.E.2d at 71.
335. Id. at 360, 439 S.E.2d at 72.
336. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 71.

337. Id.
338. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 72.
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Willard appealed that decision, and the supreme court reversed. 9
Unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court found "no evidence at all
that Willard ever authorized Coburn to create a partnership liability in
executing the [Coburn Note]. "Mo Based on that absolute lack of
evidence, the court concluded that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment to Willard. "
In Druid Associates, Ltd. v. National Income Realty Trust, 2 the
court of appeals held that a nonrecourse loan prevents a claim by the
foreclosing creditor for a deficiency based upon legal subrogation. 3'
In Druid Associates, National Income Realty Trust ("NIRT") sold the
property to Druid Associates, Ltd., taking back a promissory note and
deed to secure debt. The note was without recourse and stated in part:
"It is understood that the Maker hereof shall have no personal liability
hereunder of (sic) for a deficiency judgment upon foreclosure under the
Deed to Secure Debt, and that in the event of default, the sole and
exclusive remedy of the Holder is to look to the property through
foreclosure pursuant to the Deed to Secure Debt .... There shall be
hereunder to borrower, or its general or limited partno recourse
3
ners." "
When Druid failed to make payments required by the note, NIRT
foreclosed on the property. NIRT then filed this action seeking to
recover a delinquent $42,746 water bill against, among others, Druid
and its general partner, Harry M. Epstein.3' The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of NIRT, and Druid and Epstein appealed. 3'
Initially, the court of appeals noted that two different theories of
subrogation exist--"legal" subrogation and "conventional" subrogation." 7 Conventional subrogation arises from a contract between the
parties, whereas legal subrogation arises as a matter of equity, without
any agreement between the parties.3' Because the note precluded a

339. 264 Ga. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 697.

340. Id.
341. Id. The supreme court did not hold, however, that a partner who does not sign
a promissory note can never be liable for the debt. To establish such liability, the plaintiff
will apparently be required to produce some evidence that the debt was authorized as a
partnership liability. See id.
342. 210 Ga. App. 684, 436 S.E.2d 721 (1993).
343. Id at 685, 436 S.E.2d at 722.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 684, 436 S.E.2d at 721.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 685, 436 S.E.2d at 722.
348. Id.
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claim of conventional subrogation, NIRT based its claim on legal
subrogation and requested the court to exercise its equity powers.'
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision holding that a
nonrecourse loan defeats a post-foreclosure claim for legal subrogation.3 ° The court found that the language of the promissory note
executed by Druid clearly and unambiguously established that recovery
of the property through foreclosure was the sole remedy available to
NIRT in the event of default. 1 Based on that contractual provision,
the court found that NIRT was not entitled to legal subrogation. 2
The court in Hernandez v. Resolution Trust Corp.' also wrestled
with a question involving confirmation of a nonjudicial foreclosure."3 4
Southern Federal Savings Association conducted a foreclosure sale
pursuant to a power of sale contained in a security deed from Julio A.
Hernandez. Southern's successor-in-interest, Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") presented the sale to Magistrate Court Judge Ann
Bayneum, sitting as a presiding judge for the Superior Court of Fulton
County.m At the confirmation hearing, Hernandez objected to confirmation on the grounds that the sale had not been properly reported
because it was not reported to the judge to whom the case was assigned,
Judge Elizabeth Long. Judge Long denied Hernandez's objections and
confirmed the sale.'
The court rejected Hernandez's argument on appeal stating that the
"statutory language is plain and the clear import ... is that the report
must be made to a judge of the superior court of the county in which the
land is located." 7 Clearly, the RTC's report to the presiding judge
was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.'

349. Id
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. The court found that NIRT was not entitled to subrogation on another ground.
Legal subrogation is effective only to the extent that the party claiming subrogation has
actually paid the debt. The court found that NIRT had failed to produce any evidence it
had paid the delinquent water bill. Id. at 686, 436 S.E.2d at 723.
353. 210 Ga. App. 538, 436 S.E.2d 534 (1993).
354. Id. at 538, 436 S.E.2d at 535.
355. Id.
356. Id. Hernandez also argued that Judge Bayneum was not a superior court judge.
Like the court in March v. Resolution Trust Corp., 211 Ga. App. 216, the court found that
Judge Bayneum was property appointed to serve as a judge of the superior court. 210 Ga.
App. at 539, 436 S.E.2d at 535.
357. 210 Ga. App. at 538, 436 S.E.2d at 535.
358. Id. The court found that RTC had satisfied the statutory preconditions to
obtaining a deficiency judgment notwithstanding the requirement that the statute was to
be strictly construed against confirmation. Id.
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The Georgia Supreme Court in Wallace v. President Street, L.P 9
held that twelve months must elapse before the purchaser of property at
a tax sale may give valid notice of final foreclosure of the debtor's right
to redeem that property."
On June 5, 1990, Wallace purchased
property owned by President Street, L.P. at a tax sale for $13,720.65.
Wallace then gave notice of the foreclosure of President Street's right to
redeem by: (1) service on President Street's alleged registered agent; (2)
mailing notice to First Union National Bank of Florida (which held a
security deed covering the foreclosed property); (3) tacking notice on the
door of the office on the property; and (4) publication of a foreclosure
notice in the local legal newspaper."' The notice provided that the
right to redeem the property would be forever foreclosed on June 6, 1991,
twelve months and one day after the tax sale. 2
On May 15, 1991, President Street tendered the amount paid at the
tax sale to Wallace and sought to redeem the property. Wallace rejected
that tender as inadequate because it failed to include the additional ten
percent of the purchase price and costs of service and publication
required when tender is made after service of the notice.3 " Wallace
filed a petition to quiet title, and President Street filed a motion for
summary judgment.'" President Street's motion was based on several
grounds, but the trial court granted summary judgment based only on
its conclusion that Wallace's attempt to bar redemption of the property
was premature and that President Street's tender was timely and adequate.3
Wallace contended on appeal that the trial court erred by concluding
that notice of redemption required by O.C.G.A. section 48-4-45 may not
be sent until after the expiration of twelve months from the date of the
tax sale." The statute at issue states in part: "After 12 months from
the date of a tax sale, the purchaser ... may ... forever bar the right
to redeem the property from the sale by causing a notice ... of the
foreclosure, as provided in this article [to be served on various persons
by means specified]." 6 7 The supreme court, relying on the plain
meaning of the statute, concluded that the phrase "after 12 months"

359. 263 Ga. 239, 430 S.E.2d 1 (1993).
360. Id. at 240, 430 S.E.2d at 2.
361. Id. at 239, 430 S.E.2d at 1.
362. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 1-2.
363. 1&
364. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 2.
365. Id. at 240, 430 S.E.2d at 2.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 239 n.2, 430 S.E.2d at 1 (quoting O.C.GA § 48-4-45 (1991)) (emphasis
supplied).
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modifies and limits both the right to bar the redemption and the giving
of the notice to implement the right to bar.'
The court concluded
that twelve months must have elapsed before the right to redeem
property shall be foreclosed and before the notice of the foreclosure of the
right to redeem shall be served.'
The court further stated that the
policy in this state is to favor the rights of property owners to redeem
property based on the belief that the enforcement and collection of taxes
through of sale of property is a harsh procedure.'7 0 Therefore, Wallace's notice was ineffective, and President Street's tender of the amount
paid by Shearson at foreclosure
was sufficient to preserve its right to
71
redeem the property.3

In two -cases during the survey period, the owners of property
encumbered by deeds to secure debt attempted preemptive strikes to
stave off foreclosure. 72 In the first such case, the supreme court held
that the total amount of interest paid over the life of the loan should be
used to determine if the interest rate charged violates Georgia's usury
laws .1 7 Fleet Finance, Inc. of Georgia was the holder of promissory
notes and security deeds from Jones and two other plaintiffs (collectively
"plaintiffs").374 When Fleet threatened foreclosure, the plaintiffs filed
an action contending that Fleet was charging usurious interest rates
under O.C.G.A. section 7-4-18375 and should, therefore, be required to

forfeit all interest contracted for under the notes.7 6
In connection with its loans to plaintiffs and others, Fleet charged
front-end interest fees ranging from twenty-two percent to twenty-seven
percent of the principal amount of the loans. The borrowers did not pay
those fees in cash at closing. Instead, Fleet deducted the fees from the
face amount of the loan, thus reducing the net amount of the loan
proceeds actually paid to the borrowers. The borrowers then agreed to

368.

Id. at 240, 430 S.E.2d at 2.

369. Id.
370. Id. at 240-41,430 S.E.2d at 2 (citing 3A SutherlandStatutory Construction§ 66.08
(4th ed.)). The court's reference to the rules of statutory construction in favor of property
owners is, at best, obitur dictum. There is simply no reason for the court to have relied on
the rules of statutory construction in deciding this case given its holding that the statute
itself is clear and unambiguous. It is interesting however, to note the contrast between the
presumptions in tax foreclosure sales (against creditor) and other foreclosure sales (against
debtor). See Kong, 211 Ga. App. 93, 438 S.E.2d 132 (1993).
371. 263 Ga. at 228, 430 S.E.2d at 353.
372. Brinson v. McMillan, 263 Ga. 802, 440 S.E.2d 22 (1994); Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Jones,
263 Ga. 228, 430 S.E.2d 352 (1993).
373. 263 Ga. at 228, 430 S.E.2d at 353.
374. Id.
375. See O.C.G-A. § 7-4-18 (1989).
376. 263 Ga. at 228, 430 S.E.2d at 353.
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pay for the up front fees in small, fixed amounts over the life of the loan.
Despite that provision for repayment over the life of the loans, the
contracts themselves stated that the front-end charges were fully earned
at closing and were nonrefundable."' In addition to those fees, Fleet
rates on the outstanding balance ranging from
charged yearly interest
37 s
18.9% to 19.9%.

Plaintiffs argued that the issue of whether a loan is usurious should
be determined by deciding if the interest received in any, one month
exceeds the statutory limit. They further argued that the up-front
charges constituted interest received by Fleet during the first month of
the loan and resulted in usurious interest for that month. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs argued, the entire note was usurious and Fleet should
forfeit all interest due thereunder. 7 '
The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, and held that, under
O.C.G.A. section 7-4-18, interest had to be calculated for each individual
month of the loan and that if the interest in any one month exceeded
five percent, the entire loan was usurious.' Based on that finding, the
trial court enjoined Fleet from proceeding with any foreclosure, granted
a motion for a certification of a class, and denied Fleet's motion to
dismiss. 1
The supreme court reluctantly reversed the trial court's denial of
Fleet's motion to dismiss. 2 On appeal, Fleet contended that O.C.G.A.
section 7-4-18 must be interpreted to require the consideration of the
total interest paid over the entire period of the loan in determining if a
loan was usurious. In other words, the total interest paid (or which
would be paid) over the entire life of the loan should be divided by the
number of months in the entire period over which the loan was
scheduled to be repaid. Only if that amount exceeds five percent, would
Fleet drew its method for calculating
the loan be termed usurious.'

377. Id. at 229, 430 S.E.2d at 354.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 229-30, 430 S.E.2d at 354-55.

380. Id. at 228, 230, 430 S.E.2d at 354-55.
381. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 354.
382. Id. at 229, 430 S.E.2d at 354. The court's characterization of "Fleet's interestcharging practices" as "exorbitant, unethical and perhaps even immoral evidences the
court's reluctance to hold in favor of Fleet. Id. However, the court stated that thte burden
of changing the law to prohibit Fleets lending practices fell on the Georgia Legislature.
Id.
383. Id. at 229-30, 430 S.E.2d at 354.
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usurious
interest from the method set out in Norris v. Sigler Daisy
4
Corp.8

The supreme court found that section 7-4-18 was subject to multiple
reasonable interpretations, and that Fleet was entitled to the construction most favorable to its position, because the court was interpreting a
criminal statute.s The rule that a person alleged to have violated a
criminal statute is entitled to the most favorable interpretation applies
even where the statute is being applied in a civil context, as was the
case here.'
Construing the statute in favor of Fleet, the court found
that the phrase "per month" contained in Section 7-4-18 means "by the
month" and does not necessarily mean "in any one month."
The
court also found that the phrase "any rate of interest greater than five
percent per month" could "be read to require the lender to charge more
than 5% for each and every month of the loan, instead of for any one
month of the loan, in order for the loan to be usurious.","8
The court then stated that the meaning of section 7-4-1 supports
Fleets interpretation of section 7-4-18.3"
Moreover, because the
front-end points and fees induced Fleet to make the loan for the entire
loan and not for any one month or year, because the borrower has the
use of the amount loaned for the entire loan period, and because the
usury penalty applies to the interest for the entire contract, it was
reasonable to test the loan for usury based on the interest charged for
the entire loan period.' 90 The court also found support for Fleet's
argument and its decision in the opinions expressed by courts in other
states."
Justice Benham wrote a dissenting opinion in which he stated that the
court's holding constituted "a regrettably bold step backwards in spite

384. Id. at 230,430 S.E.2d at 354 (citing Norris v. Sigler Daisy Corp., 260 Ga. 271,392
S.E.2d 343 (1990)). Although the court found that Norris was not binding in this case, the
court did ultimately adopt that method of calculating usury for purposes of O.C.GA. § 7-418. 263 Ga. at 229 n.1, 233, 430 S.E.2d at 354 n.1, 357.
385. 263 Ga. at 233, 430 S.E.2d at 357.
386. Id. at 231, 430 S.E.2d at 355 (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S.
284, 296 (1954); Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 925 (11th Cir. 1984)).
387. Id. at 231-32, 430 S.E.2d at 356.

388. Id at 232, 430 S.E.2d at 356.
389. Id.
390. Id. Notwithstanding the statement that the holding from Norriswas not binding
and did not demand a finding in favor of Fleet in this case, the court relied heavily on the

reasoning from Norris in reaching decision. Id. at 232, 430 S.E.2d at 356.
391. Id. at 232-33, 430 S.E.2d at 356. The court cited cases decided by the courts of
Texas, Maryland, Nevada, and California and a case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id.
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of legislation, precedent, common sense and public policy to the
contrary'"s He also opined that "chaos will follow in the wake of [the
court's] decision ... and Georgia will become a safe haven for those

desirous of taking unfair advantage of unsuspecting borrowers. "
Justice Benham disagreed with the majority's finding that the Georgia
usury statute was ambiguous and, therefore, argued that the court
should refrain from engaging in judicial construction of the law.'"
Justice Benham also found precedent in the Georgia case law which he
contended demanded a result contrary to the finding that the phrase
"per month" did not refer to individual months." 6 Justice Benham
closed his dissent by chastising the majority for its statement that the
court was constrained in its holding and that the legislature must act to
prevent other lenders from pursuing a course similar to Fleet's. "To that
statement [he said] the legislature has already done its job. If further
legislative action is now needed, it is because this court has created
confusion where none previously existed." $"
In Brinson v. McMillan,97 the supreme court reviewed a trial court's
ruling on a suit to enjoin foreclosure.'m Charles McMillan, Jr. died
intestate in 1988, leaving certain tracts of land to his heirs. A title
examination conducted after his death revealed an uncancelled security
deed dated September 9,1977, from McMillan to Junie B. McMillan, now
Junie B. Brinson. The security deed stated that it secured "'one note, or
any note given in renewal of, for $46,000, dated May 27, 1976 bearing
interest at 8 percent per annum from date, due upon demand,'" and
"'any other present or future indebtedness of [McMillan] to [Brinson]."
When Brinson refused to execute a cancellation of that
security deed, McMillan's heirs (the "Heirs") filed this action seeking to
enjoin Brinson from foreclosing on the security deed and seeking
cancellation of the security deed." The trial court granted summary
judgment to the heirs, and Brinson appealed. 1

392. 263 Ga. at 234, 430 S.E.2d at 368 (Benham, J., dissenting).
393. Id

394. Id. at 235, 430 S.E.2d at 358.
395. Id. at 236-37,430 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Hartsfield Co.v. Fulwiler, 59 Ga.App. 194,
200 S.E. 309 (1938); Crowe v. State, 44 Ga. App. 719, 162 S.E. 849 (1931); Jobson v.
Masters, 32 Ga. App. 60, 122 S.E. 724 (1924)).
396. 1d at 238, 430 S.E.2d at 360.
397. 263 Ga. 802, 440 S.E.2d 22 (1994).
398. Id. at 802-03, 440 S.E.2d at 23.
399. Id. at 802, 440 S.E.2d at 23.
400. Id
401. Id.
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The heirs' first argument on appeal was that the security deed was
ineffective because McMillan never executed a $46,000 promissory note
to Brinson. Brinson had admitted in her deposition that McMillan never
executed a May 27 promissory note or any other promissory note payable
to her.40 2 However, in both her affidavit in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment and her deposition, Brinson testified that on May
27, 1976 and September 9, 1977, McMillan was indebted to her in the
amount of $46,000. Brinson further testified that McMillan never repaid
any portion of that debt and that his estate now owed $46,000 plus
interest. 4 3 Based on those factual assertions, the supreme court found
that summary judgment was improperly granted because a genuine
issue of fact regarding the validity of the security deed was raised by
Brinson's testimony.4 4
The heirs also argued that Brinson's rights under the security deed
were barred by laches because an action to collect on the debt was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 5 The court rejected
that contention and found that Brinson was not prevented from
exercising her rights under the security deed even if her action on the
underlying indebtedness was barred.'
The supreme court also
rejected the appellee's argument that there was no evidence presenting
a question of fact regarding delivery.'
VIII.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION

In Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.,4 " Atlanta Gas Light Co. ("AGL")
sought condemnation of a fifty-foot wide easement across land owned by
Walter Styers for a gas pipeline.'
The special master appointed to
determine the market value of the easement awarded Styers $17,630.
The special master also found that certain stipulations were agreed upon
by AGL and Styers, including one which required AGL to give forty-eight
hours advance notice before using the easement in nonemergency
situations. Styers appealed the special master's award which proceeded
to a jury trial on the issue of the value of the easement taken.410 The
jury returned a verdict ruling that $70,000 was just and adequate

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at 802-03, 440 S.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 803, 440 S.E.2d at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
263 Ga. 856, 439 S.E.2d 640 (1994).
Id. at 857, 439 S.E.2d at 641.
Id.
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compensation for the property taken, and judgment was entered for
Styers in that amount.4"
This action began when Styers filed a complaint in the state court
seeking damages for trespasses alleged to have been committed by AGL
on Styers' land. AGL filed a counterclaim seeking damages against
Styers for alleged interference with AGLs easement. AGL filed a
separate action in superior court seeking an injunction to prevent Styers
from interfering with AGL's easement in the future. The two actions
were consolidated in the superior court, and the trial court granted
AGL's motion for summary judgment on Styers' trespass claims and
issued an injunction forbidding Styers from interfering with the utility's
easement. The court also found that AGL was required to comply with
the notice stipulation found by the special master on the condemnation
case and both parties appealed.412
The majority of the appellate court's opinion dealt with AGL's appeal
of the forty-eight hour notice requirement.4 1 In affirming the trial
court, the court focused on the terms of the Special Master Act4 4 and
the different procedures to be followed for perfecting an appeal for
"value" versus "non-value" issues as determined by a special master.415
In addition to their primary duty of determining value in condemnation cases, special masters are also authorized to rule on "'any other
matters material to [the condemnors' or condemnees'] respective
rights.'"4 1 Either party may seek review of the master's finding as to
the value of the property or interest taken by fling an appeal for a jury
trial.4 17 However, review of the non-value issues as determined by a
special master may only be obtained by filing exceptions with "the
superior court prior to that court's entry of judgment on the special
master's award."41 ' Exceptions must be filed within ten days from
entry of the award, and failure to file any such exceptions "results in a
waiver of the right to further litigate non-value issues.'419

411. Id.
412.

Id. at 856-57, 434 S.E.2d at 641.

413. Id. at 857-60, 439 S.E.2d at 641-43. In fact, the court dealt summarily with
Styers' appeals, stating in very succinct fashion that "the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to AGL ...

and the issuance of the injunction ...

were supported by the

appropriate quantum of evidence." Id. at 860, 439 S.E.2d at 643.
414. O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102 (1982).
415. Id. at 857-60, 439 S.E.2d at 641-43.
416. Id. at 857, 439 S.E.2d at 641 (quoting O.C.GA. § 22-2-102 1982)).
417. See O.C.G.A. § 22-2-112 (1992).

418. 263 Ga. at 857, 439 S.E.2d at 641.
419. Id. at 858, 439 S.E.2d at 641.
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In this case, neither, party filed exceptions to the special master's
finding on the non-value issues, including the validity of the forty-eight
hour notice provision.' 0 AGL's failure to file exceptions created a
notice provision enforceable by Stryes."1 The court further found that
any other holding would hinder the condemnor's work on condemned
property pending the outcome of a jury trial on value, and that such a
holding would be directly contrary to the stated purpose of the Special
Master Act.4 2
The court conceded that the language contained in previous appellate
decisions "facially support[ed] AGL's contention that non-value issues
can be the subject of an 'appeal.'""' However, the court specifically
rejected AGL's arguments based on those earlier opinions and reaffirmed
"that the timely filing of exceptions to non-value issues passed on by the
special master is the [only] means by which judicial review of those
The holding of the court in Styers should clarify
issues may be had.'
any ambiguity regarding the method by which appeals may be perfected
in condemnation cases.
Stafford v. Bryan County Board of Education' also involved the
procedures for appealing awards made in condemnation cases. 4- The
Bryan County Board of Education filed a condemnation action in the
superior court against Stafford and other owners of the property to be
condemned. A special master was appointed and a hearing held after
which the special master entered an award. Stafford filed an exception
427
to that award and an appeal of the award to the superior court.
Stafford next filed on amended award, but the superior court made the
first award the judgment of the court.4m Stafford then filed exceptions
to the amended award and a notice of appeal of the valuation issue to
the superior court and obtained a certificate of immediate review
allowing an appeal of the trial court's entry of an award based on the
special master's first findings."

420. Id. at 857, 439 S.E.2d at 641.
421. Id. at 858, 439 S.E.2d at 641.
422. 263 Ga. at 858, 439 S.E.2d at 642. The Special Master Act was passed to provide
a "simpler," more effective method of condemnation. Id.
423. Id. at 859, 439 S.E.2d at 642.
424. Id. at 860, 439 S.E.2d at 642.
425. 212 Ga. App. 6, 440 S.E.2d 774 (1994).
426. Id. at 6-7, 440 S.E.2d at 775.
427. Id. at 71, 440 S.E.2d at 775.
428. Id.
429. Id
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The court of appeals found that Stafford's appeal was not appropriate
in light of the proceedings." His filing of an appeal to a jury on the
issue of value rendered the special master's award not a final judgment
subject to review. The court stated, however, that Stafford would be
entitled to appeal directly all issues regarding the condemnation once
the jury award of just and adequate compensation was no longer at issue
in the trial court." 1
The issues relevant to this survey that the court in City of Dalton v.
Smith 2 decided dealt with (1) the exclusion of evidence of an easement granted by the City of Dalton to the condemnees; (2) the use of
evidence of loss of privacy as an element of consequential damages; (3)
the use of non-expert opinion testimony regarding the value of the
property condemned; and (4) the issue of damages to the remainder of
property where only part is condemned.'
In Smith, the City of
Dalton filed a petition to condemn land, and a special master was
appointed. The special master awarded the condemnees $182,000 as the
fair market value of the condemned property and the condemnees
appealed to the superior court. 4 4 A jury returned a verdict in the
amount of $271,126, and the city appealed.4
On appeal, the city argued in part, that the court erred in excluding
from evidence a document purporting to grant the condemnees an
easement across the condemned property to the remainder of their
property.'
This document was executed more than a year after the
date the property was actually taken. Because the only question for
decision in this case was the value of the property at the time of the
actual taking, the appellate court of appeals agreed that the document
was irrelevant and therefore properly excluded from evidence.f 7
The city also argued that the court erred in refusing to give a
requested jury charge that the loss of privacy by a condemnee was not
a proper element of damages. 4 3 The court rejected that argument,
finding first that the city had waived its objection and second that the

430. Id.
431. Id.
432. 210 Ga. App. 858, 437 S.E.2d 827 (1993).
433. Id. at 858-61,437 S.E.2d at 829-31. The remainder of the City's enumerations of
error concerned the trial court's refusal to give certain jury instructions and were dealt
with, in large part, by the City's failure to preserve the issue for appeal. Id.
434. Id. at 858, 437 S.E.2d at 829.

435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id. at 859, 437 S.E.2d at 829.
Id.
Id. at 860, 437 S.E.2d at 830.
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requested charge was not an accurate statement of the law.' 9 The
court stated that "gloss of privacy is 'an element to be considered in
determining whether there were consequential damages to the remainder'" of the condemned property.' 4
The court also rejected the city's argument that the trial court erred
in allowing two non-expert witnesses to testify regarding their opinion
of the value of the property taken." 1 Both of the witnesses testified
they were familiar with the property taken and that their experience in
the construction industry gave them knowledge of land values in the
vicinity."2 The court found that the trial court had not abused its
discretion by allowing those witnesses' testimony
because they had "an
3
opportunity for forming a correct opinion.""
Finally, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to submit
to the jury the question of whether the value of the remainder of the
condemnees' property was impaired by the city's failure to guarantee
access."4 "' hether a property owner has reasonable access to the
property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was
substantially interfered with are questions of fact to be decided by the
jury.","
Forsyth County v. Greer"3 involved a claim of inverse condemnation
arising out of delays in the issuance of county building and occupancy
permits."
The Greers, while developing a subdivision in Forsyth
County, encountered delays in obtaining permits and approvals for the
development. 4' The Greers brought suit against the county, seeking
damages for the several months of delay and claiming that county
agents "took actions resulting in a 'temporary regulatory taking' of
property in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the
State of Georgia."" 9 The County moved for dismissal based on

439. Id.
440. Id. (quoting Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewer Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App.
348, 351, 299 S.E. 594, 597 (1983)).
441. Id. at 861, 437 S.E.2d at 830.
442. Id.
443. Id. (quoting O.C.GA § 24-9-66 (1982)).
444. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 831.
445. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Department of Transp., 207 Ga. App. 707, 709, 429 S.E.2d

108, 110 (1993)).
446. 211 Ga. App. 444, 439 S.E.2d 679 (1993).
447. Id. at 444-45, 439 S.E.2d at 680.
448. Id. at 445, 439 S.E.2d at 680.
449. Id. The Greers originally filed a lawsuit on the same basis which was dismissed

by a consent decree which allowed the Greers to file an inverse condemnation proceeding
up to August 27, 1990. Id. at 444-45, 439 S.E.2d at 680. Claims of a violation of the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 were abandoned by the Greers in the trial
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sovereign immunity and the Greers' failure to allege that property was
The trial court denied that motion and
taken for a public purpose.'
review.41
immediate
of
a
certificate
granted
2 The Greers' complaint alleged that
The appellate court reversed.
the acts causing the delay were (1) done by county employees without
the approval of the County Board of Commissioners; (2) did not occur as
part of a comprehensive land use plan; (3) were done with improper
motive and bad faith; and (4) were willful and wanton. However, the
Greers failed to allege that the actions were taken for a public purBased on that omission, the court agreed with the county that
pose.'
The court stated that "no
no inverse condemnation was pleaded.'
basis has been asserted upon which the [County] itself, as opposed to its
officers, could be held liable for monetary damages on the basis of [the
seizure]" as there had been no waiver of the County's sovereign
immunity defense.4 5r
The holding in Department of Transportation v. Lawrence4' addressed an award of consequential damages in connection with the
condemnation of part of the condemnees' property.' 7 The Department
of Transportation (the "DOT") sought to condemn 0.101 acres of land
belonging to the Lawrences in order to change the slope of an embankment and increase visibility at an intersection. The Lawrences brought
an action seeking just and adequate compensation for the property taken
After a trial, the jury
and consequential damages to the remainder.'
returned a verdict for the Lawrences for $19,400, and the DOT
appealed.4
On appeal, the DOT argued that the trial court erred in charging the
jury as follows:

court. Id. at 446-47, 439 S.E.2d at 682. The court also found that even had the Greers not
specifically abandoned their claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no such claim existed because
all required permits and approvals had been issued or secured. Id. at 447, 439 S.E.2d at
682.
450. 211 Ga. App. at 445, 439 S.E.2d at 680-81.
451. Id. at 445, 439 S.E.2d at 681.
452. Id. at 447, 439 S.E.2d at 682.
453. Id. at 446, 439 S.E.2d at 681.

454. Id.
455. Id. (quoting Kelleher v. Georgia, 187 Ga. App. 64, 65, 369 S.E.2d 341 (1988)).
Because this action was filed before the state constitutional amendment of 1991, waiver

of sovereign immunity was possible to the extent that the county had liability insurance
coverage. Id. at 446 n.2, 439 S.E.2d at 682 n.2.
456.
457.

212 Ga. App. 72, 441 S.E.2d 81 (1994).
Id. at 73, 441 S.E.2d at 81.

458. Id.
459. Id.
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In determining whether or not to award consequential damages, you
may consider all the factors affecting the value of the taking-of value
of the property after taking and applying it to highway construction,

including, but not limited to, traffic noises, loss of privacy, if such has
been shown to you by the evidence, such as will render it useless for
the purposes for which it was constructed.
The DOT argued that the inclusion of the phrase "will render it useless"
required the jury to assume that proximity damages rendered the house
useless as a dwelling place."1 The court of appeals disagreed, finding
that the jury charge viewed as a whole was a correct statement of the
law and was not misleading to the jury. 2 The charge itself did not
instruct the jury to conclude that the Lawrences' house was rendered
useless. Rather, the court of appeals found that the trial court had
clearly left to the jury the issue of whether proximity damages were
proper.'
In Thompson v. Georgia Department of Transportation,46 the court
of appeals held that losses resulting from an anticipated condemnation
are not compensable. 4
Thompson owned property which adjoined
public streets that the Georgia Department of Transportation (the
"DOTr) proposed to improve. After word of the DOT's proposed
improvements became public,' a purchaser of Thompson's property
and business withdrew its offer to buy. Thompson then brought this
action seeking damages for inverse condemnation and violation of civil
rights under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code ("section"
1983).' 6 The trial court granted the DOT's motion for summary
judgment on each theory of liability, and Thompson appealed.'
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.' e First, the court
found that Thompson was not entitled to damages resulting from an
anticipated condemnation, regardless of whether the claim was based on
a direct or inverse condemnation theory.470 Second, the court conclud-

460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. 209 Ga. App. 353, 433 S.E.2d 623 (1993).
465. Id. at 354, 433 S.E.2d at 621.
466. The proposed improvements were only in the planning stages and no official notice
of condemnation was ever filed. Id.
467. Id,
468. Id. at 354, 433 S.E.2d at 624.
469. Id. at 355, 433 S.E.2d at 624.
470. Id. at 354, 433 S.E.2d at 624.
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ed that the claim against the DOT based on section 1983 was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.4 71
The court concluded that Georgia
conferred upon the DOT the state's eminent domain powers in connection with public roads and transportation, and that any claim against
the DOT for its exercise of that power was improper.4
Bridges v. Departmentof Transportation473 involved a condemnation
alleged to have occurred as a result of an incorrect survey line on
Highway 441. 474 Bridges owned property fronting the Highway in
Jackson County. The Department of Transportation (the "DOT") began
a road widening project which would have adversely affected Bridges'
property. Initially, the DOT had planned to condemn part of Bridges'
property, but when the parties could not agree regarding compensation
for that taking, the DOT revised its plans so that Bridges' property
would not be condemned. Bridges then filed this lawsuit alleging that
the DOT had incorrectly surveyed the road right-of-way, substantially
extending the road onto his property and depriving him of access, even
after the revision of the plans.47
Before the DOT began and after it completed its work, Bridges had
two driveways accessing his property. There was some evidence that,
during the work, one or the other of those driveways was closed, but
never were both closed at the same time. The DOT fied a motion for
summary judgment. In support of that motion, the DOT submitted
several affidavits from project engineers and surveyors which described
the method by which the DOT surveyed the road. Bridges opposed the
DOT's motion and submitted an engineer's affidavit which concluded
that the DOT's survey was inaccurate by three to five feet along the
frontage of Bridges' property.476 However, that affidavit contained no
factual basis for the conclusion. 47 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the DOT, and Bridges appealed.478
The court of appeals affirmed the finding that the DOT had established an absence of material facts for trial.47 The court found that
the DOT, by presenting factual testimony regarding the way it surveyed
the right-of-way and evidence that the center line of the Highway had
not been moved since at least 1962, established that its survey was

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

Id. 433 S.E.2d at 625.
Id.
209 Ga. App. 33, 432 S.E.2d 634 (1993).
Id. at 33, 432 S.E.2d at 634.
Id., 432 S.E.2d at 634-35.
Id. at 33-34, 432 S.E.2d at 635.
Id.
Id. at 33, 432 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 34, 432 S.E.2d at 635.
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correct.'
Therefore, the DOT had discharged its burden on summary
judgment "by pointing out by reference to the affidavits... that there
is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."'
In the face of that evidence, Bridges could not simply rely on his
pleadings, but was required to point to specific evidence giving rise to a
triable issue of fact. His failure to do so required summary judgment be
granted to the DOT.4ft
The court also affirmed a grant of summary judgment with regard to
Bridges' complaint of temporary inconvenience by having one or the
other of his driveways closed during construction.'
In essence, the
court restated the well-settled rule that damages for such temporary
inconveniences are not recoverable as just and adequate compensation
for condemned realty.'
IX. TRESPASS
In Groves v. City of Atlanta,' the primary issue addressed on
appeal was the extent of a public works contractor's liability for damages
alleged as a result of its trespass on private property.' In Groves, the
City of Atlanta hired John D. Stephens, Inc. to clear certain properties
which were designated as borrow sites for fill soil being used in the
construction of a new concourse at Hartsfield International Airport. The
city hired Atlanta Airport Engineers ("AAE") to provide professional
services in connection with the preparation of the borrow sites. 7
The city sent letters to some, but not all of the private owners of the
land within the proposed borrow site offering to purchase the property.
However, the city never purchased the four sites at issue in this case.
Pursuant to instructions it received from AAE, Stephens began clearing
the site. The owners of the sites not owned by the city brought an action
against the city, Stephens, and others seeking injunctive relief and
damages from the trespass.'
The trial court granted Stephens
motion for summary judgment and granted a partial summary judgment

480. Id.
481. Id. (quoting Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991)).

482. Id.
483. Id. at 34-35, 432 S.E.2d at 635-36.
484. Id. at 34, 432 S.E.2d at 635. Bridges raised one other issue on appeal regarding
the DOT's alleged closure of one driveway into this property. However, the court concluded
that Bridges had not preserved that issue for appeal because it was not raised as an issue
in the pretrial order entered in the case. Id at 35, 432 S.E.2d at 636.
485. 213 Ga. App. 455, 444 S.E.2d 809 (1994).
486. Id. at 456-58, 444 S.E.2d at 810-12.
487. Id. at 455-56, 444 S.E.2d at 810.
488. Id.
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for the city, and dismissed the property owners' claim for punitive
damages.
In sum, the court found little merit in any argument set
forth by the adversely affected property owners.
. The property owners contended on appeal that the trial court erred in
finding that no question of fact existed to establish that Stephens
performed its work for the city despite knowing that the city did not own
the land. 49 The court rejected the property owners' argument, stating
that "the evidence show[ed] that as soon as the possibility of a trespass
was raised, Stephens sought guidance from its superior, AAE, the city's
agent, and was instructed to proceed because the city owned the
property."9 1
The court based its finding on the uncontroverted
testimony of Cantwell, Stephens project superintendent, and Hayes,
Cantwell testified that the contract
AAE's chief resident engineer.4'
documents showed the city was the owner of the property. He also
testified that when a man notified him that the city might not own the
property, he referred that person to AAE and requested that he obtain
clarification there. Thereafter, Cantwell discussed the situation with
Hayes and was assured that the property had belonged to the city for
many years. 493 Given that testimony, the court applied the general
rule that a public works contractor is not liable for damage to private
property resulting from his work absent negligence or willful tort by the
contractor. 494 Hayes' testimony that Stephens had followed the plans
and specifications for the project demanded the conclusion that the city,
was liable for the damages claimed by the property ownif anyone,
495
ers.
The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the issue
of punitive damages against the city.4 " The court relied on a recent
decision by the supreme court finding that an award of punitive

489. Id. Plaintiffs only appealed the grant of summary judgment to Stephens and the
dismissal of their claim against the City for punitive damages. Id. at 456, 444 S.E.2d at

811.
490.
491,
492,
493,
494,

Id.
Id. at 458, 444 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 456-57, 444 S.E.2d at 811.
Id.
Id. at 457, 444 S.E.2d at 811 (citing C.W. Matthews & Co. v. Wells, 147 Ga. App.

457,458-59,249 S.E.2d 281,282(1978) and Abercrombie v. Ledbetter-Johnson Co., 116 Ga.

App. 376, 157 S.E.2d 493 (1967)). The court noted the exception to that rule for cases
involving inherently dangerous activity, but found that the exception did not apply in this

instance. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 811-12.
495. Id. at 457-58, 444 S.E.2d at 812.
496, Id. at 458, 444 S.E.2d at 812.
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damages against a governmental entity is against public policy and is
impermissible as a matter of law.497
In contrast to the holding in Groves, the court of appeals held in
Rossee Oil Co. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.49 that punitive
damages may be awarded against a public service company for
intentional torts.4'
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. entered onto
property owned by Rosse Oil Co. and buried a telephone cable in the
ground. BellSouth did so after being told by a Department of Transportation ("DOT") representative that there were no conflicts at that location
and that BellSouth could install its telephone line there. In fact,
BellSouth had no express authorization to install its telephone line on
Rossee's property, and there was conflicting evidence regarding implied
authorization for BellSouth to install its phone lines.'
Rossee brought an action against BellSouth for willful trespass and
sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and
expenses of litigation."ol
BellSouth filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that Rossee was not entitled to recover punitive
damages and attorney fees. BellSouth argued that Rossee was only
entitled to damages of the type that would be authorized in a condemnation proceeding.'
BellSouth also asserted that insufficient evidence
existed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that BellSouth's
conduct in this case "showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences."'
The trial
court accepted BellSouth's arguments and granted its motion for
summary judgment.'
Rossee appealed. 5
The court of appeals cited Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff,' for
the proposition that punitive damages are available in an action against
a public utility corporation based on intentional conversion and trespass

497. Id (citing MARTA v. Boswell, 261 Ga. 427, 405 S.E.2d 869 (1991)).

498. 212

Ga. App. 235, 441 S.E.2d 464 (1994).

499. Id. at 236, 441 S.E.2d at 465-66.
500. Id. at 235, 441 S.E.2d at 465. BellSouth presented evidence that Rossee's
president knew that BellSouth was installing cable on Rossee's property at the time the
cable was being buried. To contradict this evidence, Rossee presented its president's
affidavit that he had no knowledge of BellSouth's activities until at least eight days after
burial of the cable was complete. Id. at 236 n.1, 441 S.E.2d at 465 n.1.
501. Id. at 236, 441 S.E.2d at 465.
502. Id. at 235, 441 S.E.2d at 465.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 236, 441 S.E.2d at 465.
505. Id.
506.

210 Ga. App. 299, 436 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
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to realty. 7 The court also noted that there is no case authority
precluding those damages where there exists clear and convincing
evidence establishing one or more of the criteria for awarding punitive
damages.'
The court found BellSouth's reliance upon the statement
by the DOT representative that BellSouth could bury its cable on
Rossee's property without further investigation "does not negate a
genuine issues of material fact regarding BellSouth's entire want of care
in securing actual authority for placement of [the] cable over Rossee's
property."" For that reason, the court reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment against Rossee's claim for punitive damages. 10
The court also reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
against Rossee's claim for attorney fees and expenses of litigation.5 1
The court found that an award of damages for an intentional tort, like
trespass or conversion, "generally will support a claim for expenses
under O.C.G.A. [section] 13-6-11" on the theory that intentional tortious
conduct is evidence of bad faith by the tortfeasor."
Maxwell v. City of Chamblee"' involved claims of trespass and
nuisance brought against a municipality based on its unlawful granting
of variances for nonconforming uses on the property adjoining that of the
plaintiff.514 Maxwell claimed that the City of Chamblee, and the city's
mayor and city council unlawfully granted variances for nonconforming
uses to Bergen-Hudson Construction, Inc. ("B-H"). Maxwell sought to
recover damages which he alleged resulted from that nonconforming use.
In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, the city
asserted two defenses: the statute of limitations and Maxwell's failure
to give notice to the city.515 The trial court concluded that Maxwell's
allegations of continuing trespass and nuisance were not time barred
since Maxwell was entitled to recover damages accruing within the four
years prior to filing of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial court denied
summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. However, the
trial court granted summary judgment to the city based on Maxwell's

507.

Rossee Oil Co., 212 Ga. App. at 236, 441 S.E.2d at 465.

508.
509.
510.
511.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

512.

Id., 441 S.E.2d at 466 (quoting Wisenbaker v. Warren, 196 Ga. App. 651,552,396

S.E.2d 528, 531 (1990)).
513.

212 Ga. App. 135, 441 S.E.2d 257 (1994), cert. granted.

514. Id. at 135, 441 S.E.2d at 257.
515.

Id.
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failure to give the ante litem notice required in Georgia for claims
against municipalities.51
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling in part. 17 The
court agreed that material questions of fact existed regarding Maxwell's
claims for continuing trespass and continuing nuisance.5 1 Despite the
fact that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had provided written
notice of his claim against the city, as required by O.C.G.A. section
36-33-5,519 the court concluded
that summary adjudication was improp520
erly granted to the city.
A continuing trespass or nuisance gives rise to a cause of action every

day that it continues, and the party harmed by the trespass is entitled
to recover all damages that accrue during the four years prior to filing

the lawsuit.5 21

Accordingly, the court concluded that "summary

judgment was proper 'only [as to] those trespasses or nuisances which
5 22
occurred more than four years prior to the filing of the complaint.'
Maxwell was not precluded from giving notice to the City, in accord with
O.C.G.A. section 36-33-5, of damages that continued to occur on his
property as a result of the nonconforming uses on the neighboring
property,
and he was not precluded from recovering for those damag5

es. 23

516. Id.
517. Id. at 137, 441 S.E.2d at 259.
518. Id. at 136, 441 S.E.2d at 258.
519. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 259. O.C.GA. § 36-33-5 states in pertinent part:
(a) No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money damages against any
municipal corporation on account of injuries to person or property shall bring any
action against the municipal corporation for such injuries, without first giving
notice as provided in subsection (b) of the Code section.
(b) Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a claim against
a municipal corporation is predicated, the person, firm, or corporation having such
claim shall present the claim in writing to the governing authority of the
municipal corporation for adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of the
injury, as nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. No
action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal corporation until
the cause of action therein has first been presented to the governing authority for
adjustment.
O.C.GA § 36-33-5 (1993).
520. 212 Ga. App. at 137, 441 S.E.2d at 259. The court specifically found that oral
notice of the claim to the governing body was insufficient to satisfy the statutory
precondition to maintaining an action against a municipality. Id
521. Id. at 136, 441 S.E.2d at 258-59.
522. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 259.
523. Id
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The court remanded the case to the trial court "for entry of judgment
However, it is unclear from the
consistent with [the] opinion."'?
court's opinion exactly what is to happen upon remand. The court
implied that the fling of the complaint was written notice to the
city.525 If that is the case, then Maxwell will be deemed to have
preserved his claim for all damages that occurred as a result of the city's
trespass from a point six months before the complaint was filed. What
is more likely to happen is that the trial court will dismiss Maxwell's
claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-12(b)(6) with leave to refile. 26 Maxwell would then be able to give notice to the city pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 36-33-5 and pursue an action for all damages
accruing since a date six months before the giving of that notice.
X.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Anand,2 7 Vijay

Anand executed a commercial lease with
In Dwyer v.
Atlanta Rainbow, Inc. for the lease of a commercial building from
February 1, 1990 through January 31, 1995. 52 The monthly rent was
$3,300, and Lawrence Dwyer executed a personal guaranty of Rainbow's
obligations under the lease. When a dispute arose over a water leak in
the property, Rainbow ceased paying the rent. On September 5, 1991,
Anand filed an action against Rainbow and Dwyer seeking to recover the
past due rent for August 1991. Anand never amended his pleadings to
claim rents which became due during the pendency of the action.52 9
At trial, Rainbow and Dwyer objected to testimony regarding rents
that had come due since the filing of the complaint."0 The trial court
overruled those objections. Following a bench trial, the trial court
entered a judgment for Anand for unpaid rents totaling $38,300 and
Rainbow and Dwyer appealed."'
Because Anand failed to amend his pleadings to include a prayer for
recovery of rents other than that due in August 1991, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court. 2 The court stated that a landlord,

524. Id. at 137, 441 S.E.2d at 259.
525. Id. at 136, 441 S.E.2d at 258. The court stated "there is no evidence that Maxwell
provided written notice of his claim... before filing suit.* Id.
526. The court stated that Maxwell's claims, in their current posture, were "not subject
to substantive adjudication." 212 Ga. App. at 137, 441 S.E.2d at 259.
527. 210 Ga. App. 419, 436 S.E.2d 532 (1993).
528. Id. at 419, 436 S.E.2d at 533.
529. Id. at 419-20, 436 S.E.2d at 533-34.
530. Id. at 420, 436 S.E.2d at 534.
531. Id. at 419, 436 S.E.2d at 533.
532. Id. at 420, 436 S.E.2d at 534.
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fUn order to recover rents that become due after commencement of an
action seeking rents that are already past due, ... must amend his
original complaint under O.C.GA § 9-11-15(a), supplement his
pleadings under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(d), or try the additional issues with
the express or implied consent of the other party in accordance with
O.C.GA § 9-11-15(b).w3
Anand did not contend that he amended or supplemented his pleadings.
The court found that Rainbow's and Dwyer's objection to consideration
of Anand's claims for additional rent at the beginning of and throughout
the trial 4established that this issue was not tried by consent of the
53
parties.
In Hicks v. McLain's Building Materials,Inc.,' the court of appeals
held that, absent special damages, no cause of action exists against a
materialman who improperly files a lien against real property. 6 Ms.
Hicks and her husband were building a new home using Gerel Bartlett
as their builder. Hicks instructed that all deliveries of materials to the
building site were to be on a "C.O.D." basis. However, it was undisputed
that some deliveries were not paid for at the time of delivery. Plaintiff
dismissed Bartlett in November 1990."
Thereafter, a dispute arose between Hicks and McLain's Building
Materials regarding payment of two invoices for materials alleged to
have been delivered and incorporated into the house. The first invoice
was for $2,520.93 for standard building supplies. The second invoice
was for $19,858.60 which McLain contended represented the cost of a
special order of non-standard doors and windows. McLain filed two
separate materialmen's liens against Hicks' property, but failed to notify
her of the liens. Subsequently, Hicks paid the bill for $2,520.93, but
McLain failed to cancel the lien.'
When Hicks discovered the liens during a title search, she filed this
action against McLain. McLain released the liens before answering the
complaint, but Hicks refused to dismiss her claims. The first two counts
of Hicks' complaint were styled "Filing of Fraudulent Materialmen's
Liens," one for each lien fied by McLain. The final count was for

533. Id. at 419, 436 S.E.2d at 533.
534. Id. at 420, 436 S.E.2d at 534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

209 Ga. App. 191, 433 S.E.2d 114 (1993).
Id. at 192-93, 191 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 191, 191 S.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 191-92, 191 S.E.2d at 116.
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fraudulent misrepresentation." 9 The trial court granted McLain's
motion for summary judgment on all three counts of the complaint." °
The court of appeals first concluded that no cause of action exists in
Georgia for the filing of fraudulent liens, and that the trial court
properly treated those counts as claims for defamation of title. 1 The
court then considered Hicks' argument that the attorney fees she
incurred as a result of the liens satisfied the requirement of special
damages and established that a cause of action existed. 2 The court
rejected that argument, affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, and stated that "the costs of litigation and attorney fees
cannot constitute the required special damage, as such costs and fees
will be present in any suit and treating them as special damage would
render the special damage requirement meaningless.'
Hicks argued that she was entitled to rely on O.C.G.A. section
44-14-362' of the Materialman's Lien Statute to support her claim for
damages as a result of the $2,520.93 lien." 5 That code section provides that a person who files a preliminary notice of lien pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.3 must "cause the notice [of preliminary lien
rights] to be canceled of record within ten days after final payment" or
be liable to the owner for all actual damages, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees." However, the court found that McLain had filed the
lien pursuant 647
to O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1 and that section 44-14-362
did not apply.
Hicks' also attempted to rely on the Materialman's Lien Statute to
support her claim for additional damages as a result of the improper
notice of the $19,858.60 lien. She argued that she could recover
damages because of McLain's failure to notify her of the filing of the
lien."' The court rejected that argument, finding that the statute did
not create an action for damages from its violation." 9 The only
penalty for failure to provide notice as required is that the lien is
unenforceable.550
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The court also upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
McLain on Hicks' fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court found
that Hicks' failure to present evidence regarding McLain's knowledge of
the false statements at the time of the misrepresentation or McLain's
intent to deceive rendered Hicks' claim without merit." 1 In fact, the
court characterized plaintiff's allegation of fraud as "fanciful and without
merit."552
In South River Farms v. Beardon,5" the court of appeals explained
the meaning of the term "involved" and clarified when a lis pendens is
proper because real property is "involved" in a lawsuit.'
James and
Janice Beardon filed a pleading entitled "Notice of Intent to Sue" in
Webster County against South River Farms, Ed Simmons, and others
alleging that they had harassed the Beardons and prevented them from
peaceful enjoyment of their property. In conjunction with that pleading,
the Beardons filed several lis pendens for parcels of property owned by
South River. In response, South River brought an action against the
Beardons to cancel the lis pendens and prayed for damages for slander
of title.56
The trial court granted the Beardons' motion to dismiss
South River's complaint for failure to state a claim, and South River appealed.5
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that the trial
court erred in dismissing South River's complaint. 7
.C.G.A. section
44-14-610 permits a notice of lis pendens to be recorded only regarding
suits in which real property is "involved."5
The word "involved"
refers to cases where the realty is "actually and directly brought into
litigation by the pleadings in a pending suit and as to which some relief
is sought respecting that particular property.' 9 Because the Beardons'
suit asserted no claim of interest or ownership in South River's property,
but rather sought to include the property only as security to pay the
judgment they hoped to win, the court concluded that the lis pendens
were improperly filed.5
The court then rejected the Beardons' arguments that they were
protected from liability for the filing of the lis pendens under the
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privilege granted allegations contained in pleadings and that South
River had failed to provide any proof of damages. 1
The court first concluded that the privilege afforded properly filed
pleadings did not apply in this case because the lis pendens were
improperly filed. 2 With regard to proof of damages, the court concluded that evidence in the record of a lost contract for the sale of one
parcel of land subject to the is pendens and evidence that South River
was forced to obtain a quitclaim deed from the Beardons established
sufficient factual circumstances to support South River's claim for
damages.'
This case serves a warning against the random filing of
lis pendens because of the perception of real property's great value in
payment of judgments.
XI.

LEGISLATIE DEVELOPMENTS

There were several legislative enactments of importance to real estate
practitioners during the survey. The first is related to a topic presented
in last year's survey.s Last year, Georgia took its first step toward
a central recording system for the filing of instruments reflecting
security interests in personal property.6 5 Article 9 has been amended
again this year to provide for the central filing of "fixture filings" to
perfect security interests in personalty that is attached to realty.56
The legislature has also extended the date on which the central filing
system is scheduled to be fully operational. The central filing index was
originally scheduled to be in use by July 1, 1994, but to accommodate
problems experienced by the implementing body-the "Georgia Superior
Court Clerks' Cooperative
Authority"-that time has been extended to
7
January 1, 1995.5
One legislative development which will immediately affect most real
estate lawyers is an amendment to Chapter 2 of Title 44 relating to the

561. Id. at 158, 433 S.E.2d at 518.
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564. See T. Daniel Brannan, Stephen M. LaMastra & T. Michael Tennant, Real
Property,45 MERCER L. REv. 363, 398-99 (1993) (discussing the adoption of a central filing
system under Article 9 of the U.C.C.).
565. See O.C.G.A. § 11-9-401(1) (1994) ("The proper place to file in order to perfect a
security interest is with the clerk of the superior court of any county of the state.")
(emphasis supplied).
566. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-313(b).
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for inclusion on search reports shall consist of all currently effective original financing
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requirements for recordation of deeds and other instruments of title.
O.C.G.A. section 44-2-14' has been amended to state:
No affidavit prepared under Code Section 44-2-20 and no instrument
by which the title to real property or any interest therein is conveyed,
created, assigned, encumbered, disposed of, or otherwise affected shall
be entitled to recordation unless the name and mailing address of the
natural person to whom the affidavit or instrument is to be returned
is legibly printed, typewritten, or stamped upon such affidavit or
instrument at the top of the first page thereof.'
This simple procedural change presents a significant trap for the
unwary. The absence of a name of a natural person and that person's
address from the instrument to be recorded could result in delay in
perfected title or other interests in realty as the clerks of the various
courts are likely to return the documents without recordation. The long
delays encountered in some counties may lead the party submitting the
incomplete document to wait weeks before inquiring if the document has
been recorded and the interest in the property perfected. In that time,
parties with competing interests may have recorded their own complete
instrument and take priority over the imperfect instrument.
Another legislative development clarifies the effect of a bona fide
purchaser's possession of property which would otherwise be subject to
a judgment lien. O.C.G.A. section 9-12-93... has been amended and
now reads:
When any person has bona fide and for a valuable consideration
purchased real or personal property and has been in possession of the
real property for four years or of the personal property for two years,
such property shall be discharged from the lien of any judgment
against the person from whom it was purchased or against any
predecessor in title of real or personal property. Nothing contained
herein shall be construed to otherwise affect the validity or enforceability of such judgment, except to discharge such property from any such
lien of judgment.7 1
The addition of the phrase "or against any predecessor in title of real or
personal property ..

."

clarifies that the exception to imposition of a

judgment
lien extends to bona fide purchasers remote from the judgment
572
debtor.

568. O.C.GA. § 44-2-14.
569. Id. § 44-2-14(b) (1994).

570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.

1994]

REAL PROPERTY

463

In addition, the legislature has amended the procedure for appealing
a judgment entered in a dispossessory action between a landlord and a
tenant.57 3 Previously, appeals from the trial court in dispossessory
actions were timely filed if made within thirty days from the date of
entry of the trial court's judgment. That time period has now been
shortened to ten days.574 As a result, a tenant must make a much
quicker decision whether to appeal an adverse decision.
Moreover, the court may now order an appealing tenant to pay into
the registry of the court "all sums found by the trial court to be due for
rent" and "all future rent as it becomes due until the issue has been
finally determined on appeal.""75 Those requirements give landlords
more protection for their interest in rents due from defaulting tenants.
They also increase the financial burden imposed on tenants involved in
dispossessories and will likely lead to a decrease in the number of
appeals by tenants from adverse trial court decisions.
There were two significant amendments during the survey period to
Chapter 3 of Title 44 dealing with specialized land transactions. The
first was the addition of an Article 6 to the chapter known as the
Georgia Property Owners' Association Act.57 The Property Owners'
Association Act establishes, among other things, the method for creating
homeowners' associations,5 77 and defines the powers of those associations after creation. 78 The Act also permits such associations to
assess fees against the property owners in the association and provides
an enforcement mechanism to force payment of those fees.5" 9 Failure
to pay assessments as they come due may result in a loss of privilege to
Further, all
use common areas maintained by the association.'
unpaid assessments become liens, in favor of the association, against the
property owned by the nonpaying property owner.5'
An amendment providing for an enforcement mechanism was also
made to the Georgia Condominium Act." 2 A condominium association
may now withhold utility service to condominium units where the owner

573. See O.C.GA. § 44-7-56 (1994).
574. Id. The statute now reads "Any judgment by the trial court shall be appealable
pursuant to Chapters 2, 3, 6, and 7 of Title 5, provided that any such appeal shall be filed
Id. (emphasis supplied).
within ten days of the date such judgment was entered ....
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or other occupant thereof fails to pay assessments as required by the
The right of the association is limited to
association agreement.'
times when it has obtained a judgment or judgments in its favor in
excess of $750.'
Finally, the Georgia Legislature has passed an amendment to Title 12
of the Official Code of Georgia which directly affect real property.'
O.C.G.A. section 12-13-12 was amended and now provides that:
"The state shall have a lien on the real property on which the underground storage tanks which caused the discharge are located, even if
owned by a person other than the owner or operator [of the tanks],
provided the owner or operator is in privity with the real property
owner."
That amendment extends the state's lien rights to persons who may
have no connection with a discharge of a regulated substance from an
underground storage tank and provides an extra measure of leverage for
the state to collect funds owed to the Underground Storage Tank Trust
Fund. 7
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